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Plaintiff seaman, injured on defendant's ship, brought an action for
damages alleging negligence under the Jones Act' and unseaworthiness
under the general maritime law.2 The suit was instituted in a Texas state
court two years and ten months after the accident. The trial court found
against plaintiff on both counts, and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, in
an appeal limited solely to the issue of unseaworthiness, affirmeda on the
ground that the Texas two-year statute of limitations for personal injury
actions 4 barred the suit. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that when an action for unseaworthiness is combined with an
action for negligence under the Jones Act, a court cannot apply a shorter
period of limitations to the former than the three-year period which Congress has prescribed for the latter. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
Three possible grounds exist upon which an injured seaman may
recover damages. The first, maintenance and cure 3 is provided irrespective
of the nature or cause of the illness or injury,6 so long as it occurs during
the employment period. 7 In addition, he may sue for damages sustained
1. 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
2. Plaintiff also sought to recover maintenance and cure, as provided under the
general maritime law. The trial court awarded him $6,258. This award was not in
issue in this appeal. Instant case at 223.
3. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 290 S.W2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
4. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5526 (1958).
5. This remedy was first announced in the United States by Mr. Justice Story
in Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480 (No. 6,047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823). It requires
that the shipowner-employer provide the seaman with medical care and a living allowance for a limited period of time. See Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949) ;
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938). It also entitles the seaman to
receive his lost wages for the remainder of the voyage, Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor,
supra at 528, or the remainder of the employment period, Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946).
6. Thus, even though the employer exercised all necessary care, he is absolutely
liable for maintenance and cure. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 134
(1928). In addition the courts have held the doctrine to include illness and disease
not caused by the employment, Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527, 528
(1938), and have extended coverage to the seaman even though his injury was solely
the result of his own negligence, Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949). Only
the seaman's willful misconduct seems to bar his recovery. Id. at 516 (dictum). See
also Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 528 (1950).
7. Even the seaman injured while on shore leave is protected under this right.
Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
(255)
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in consequence of the ship, or its appliances, being unseaworthy.8 This rule
imposes in effect absolute liability on the shipowner, 9 provided the seaman
is able to prove that the ship is in some respect not fit for its purpose ' 0
and that his injuries were caused by such defect." Both of these rights
were created by the federal courts sitting in admiralty. 12 These courts,
however, specifically ruled that, except for maintenance and cure, a seaman
had no right of action against his employer for injuries caused by negligence. 13 To provide such a right, Congress enacted the Jones Act, subjecting the shipowner to liability for injuries caused by his negligence or the
negligence of his employees, 14 while leaving the seaman's actions for
maintenance and cure and for unseaworthiness unimpaired. 1 The Supreme
Court has held, however, that unseaworthiness and negligence constitute
but a "single cause of action" and must be joined in one suit or the one not
brought will be forfeited. 6 Under the saving clause of the Federal Judiciary
8. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), first announced that this remedy was available to injured seamen. While the proposition was dictum, by its constant repetition
in subsequent cases it has become the classical statement of a seaman's rights.
9. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94, 95 (1946); Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 428-29, 432 (1939); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255, 259, 260 (1922).
10. Courts have held a ship to be unseaworthy not only where equipment, such as
a winch, is defective, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), and where
the ship is without life preservers, Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255
(1922), but also where staging fell due to negligence of an employee in selecting
defective rope for its rigging, Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944),
and where incompetent personnel, Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515
(2d Cir. 1952), or persons with propensities for violence, Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S.
Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955), have been hired.
11. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903) (dictum). See also cases cited
note 9 supra.

12. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903)

(dictum).

13. Id. at 175.
14. The act provides in part that: "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury
in the course of his employment may . . . maintain an action for damages at law,
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury
to railway employees shall apply . . . " 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1952). The pertinent provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act which are
thereby incorporated into the Jones Act provide that the carrier will be liable for
"injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the
officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency,
due to its negligence, in its . . . boats, wharves, or other equipment." 53 Stat. 1404
(1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
15. Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
16. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927). Cf. Pate v. Standard
Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498, 501-02 (5th Cir. 1952); McCarthy v. American E.
Corp., 175 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1949). An action for maintenance and cure, on the
other hand, may be maintained separately even though the cause of action arises from
the same injury. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928) ; The Rolph, 299
Fed. 52 (9th Cir. 1924). In light of the practicalities this permissive split is understandable, for the seaman would normally have an immediate need for maintenance
and cure, and the elements of proof are completely different.
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Act 17 all three actions may be brought in the state courts,' 8 as well as in
the federal admiralty 19 and law courts. 20 While the existence of concurrent
jurisdiction in three different courts originally caused some confusion as to
which law-federal, maritime, or state-was controlling, 21 it is now settled
that federal substantive law governs, regardless of the forum. 22 In deter-

mining whether the filing of an unseaworthiness action is timely, the equitable doctrine of laches has been applied in both the admiralty 23 and federal
law 24 courts. In so doing, however, these courts have analogized to the
statute of limitations of the state in which the court sits, 25 limiting plaintiff
to that period unless both no inexcusable delay on his part and lack of
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952).
18. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) (Jones Act and
maintenance and cure) ; Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926) (Jones Act) ; Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) (dictum) (unseaworthiness) ; Carlisle
Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922) (by implication) (unseaworthiness).
19. The authority vested in the admiralty court is derived from art. III, §2 of
the United States Constitution, which provides that the judicial power of the United
States shall extend to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," and from
§ 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76-77 (noxw 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952)), which
conferred original jurisdiction upon the district court in such cases. Clearly, actions
for maintenance and cure, or under the unseaworthy law, or the Jones Act fall within
its boundaries. London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 279 U.S. 109
(1929) (unseaworthiness actions); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924)
(Jones Act actions) ; The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (by implication) (both unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure actions).
In admiralty, trial is to a judge rather than to a jury. Jordine v. Walling, 185
F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950). Moreover, jurisdictional requirements are more easily
satisfied. Brown v. C. D. Mallory & Co., 122 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1941). See also
Jordine v. Walling, supra at 667.
20. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 88, 89 (1946) (unseaworthiness);
Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924) (Jones Act); Lee v. Pure Oil Co.,
218 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1955).

See also BENEDiCr, ADmRAuLTY 20 (6th ed. 1940).

21. See, e.g., Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674, 691 (1893).
22. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Garrett v. MooreMcCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) ; Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S.
372 (1918). See also GIramoR & BlACK, ADnMtALY §§ 6-58----6-61 (1957) ; Stevens,
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 HA~v. L. REv.
246 (1950).
23. The Key City (Young v. The Steamboat Key City), 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
653 (1871). While this case dealt with a lien, it is cited by admiralty courts, regardless
of the maritime issue, as establishing that only laches can bar a delayed action. See
also Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956); Gardner v. Panama
R.R., 342 U.S. 29 (1951).
24. Finley v. United States, 244 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Pure Oil Co. v. Geotechnical Corp., 129 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. La. 1955); White v. American Barge Lines,
127 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Pa. 1955) ; Loraine v. Coastwise Lines, Inc., 86 F. Supp.
336 (N.D. Cal. 1949). See also the cases cited in instant case at 224 n.5. Two federal
cases holding that the state statute of limitations is determinative are Bonam v.
Southern Menhaden Corp., 284 Fed. 360 (S.D. Fla. 1922), and Land v. United States
Lines Co., 137 F. Supp. 376 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), which relies on Marshall v. International
Mercantile Marine Co., 39 F2d 551 (2d Cir. 1930).

This latter case, however, applied

laches in determining whether a claim was stale.
25. Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956); LeGate v.
Panamolga, 221 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Morales v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
208 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 189
303 (3d Cir. 1951); Westfall Larson & Co. v. Allman-Hubble Tug Boat Co., 73
200 (9th Cir. 1934).

The
Inc.,
F.2d
F.2d
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prejudice to defendant are shown. 26 State courts, in enforcing other federally created rights, have, in the absence of a specific federal statute, been
permitted to apply their own statutes of limitations 2 7 Prior to the instant
case, whether they were also free to apply these statutes to unseaworthiness
actions had not been decided, although they are bound by the Jones Act
28
provision in negligence actions.
The majority in the instant case reasoned that since the two grounds
for recovery must be brought in a single suit, applying the state statute
to the unseaworthiness action would compel the seaman either to bring a
combined action within two years or to forfeit his right to recover for
unseaworthiness. 29 This, in the majority's view, would in effect be permitting the states to "indirectly" shorten the Jones Act period. On the
other hand, it may be argued, as did the dissent, that applying the state
statute to unseaworthiness in no way impairs the Jones Act. Even though
the state statute has run, the seaman is not barred from bringing a negligence
action, which is all that that act requires.3 0 The correctness of either
position would seem to rest upon a judgment as to whether unseaworthiness
and negligence in this situation are to be viewed as constituting two distinct
causes of action, to which two differing statutes can be applied, or as a
single cause which only one statute can govern.31 On this basis, the
majority view seems preferable. The practicalities of the situation are such
26. Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956); Gardner v.
Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29 (1951); LeGate v. The Panamolga, 221 F.2d 689 (Zd Cir.
1955) ; Taylor v. Crain, 195 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1952); Marshall v. International
Mercantile Marine Co., 39 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1930).
27. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
392 (1946) ; Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96 (1941).
28. Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926).
29. It is interesting to note that if plaintiff had alleged only unseaworthiness and
this action had been dismissed, he would have been able to bring suit on the same
allegation in the admiralty court where laches would determine timeliness. See note 23
supra. Res judicata would not bar the suit since there was no trial on the merits.
Warner v. Buffalo Drydock Co., 67 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S.
678 (1933). See also Stokke v. Southern Pac. Co., 169 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1947). In
the instant case, plaintiff is barred by res judicata from instituting suit in another
court since he has had a trial on the issue of negligence under the Jones Act and
therefore is in a position similar to that of the plaintiff in Baltimore S.S. Co. v.
Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927). See note 16 mupra.
30. The dissent thought that in the absence of a congressional determination of
the period of limitations for unseaworthiness actions, the federal right should be
governed by the state statute. It cited supporting cases extensively. Instant case
at 232. It should be noted, however, that not one of the cited cases deals with an
admiralty problem, and that each case involved a federal statute creating a right but
not limiting the period in which it could be brought. Arguably, Congress knowingly
was silent, intending by such silence that the state statute of limitations should be
controlling. However, since it was the admiralty court that created a remedy for
unseaworthiness, no like inference can be drawn from the silence of Congress. Indeed
this type of reasoning leads to an exactly opposite conclusion; just as Congress
created the Jones Act with a three-year period of limitations, so the Court has
created unseaworthiness with laches as its period of limitations.
31. In one sense, the causes are separate in that an action can be brought on a
single one. It does not necessarily follow, however, that for purposes of applying
periods of limitations they must be viewed as separate causes even though combined
in a single suit.

1958]
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that both theories will be alleged in a single suit; it is difficult to determine
before trial which theory of recovery will in fact enable plaintiff to win
a verdict 3 2 Not only must the two theories be joined, if both are to be
brought, but such joinder is desirable in order to effect a complete determination of the seaman's rights with the least amount of litigation. Moreover, forcing the seaman to forego taking advantage of the full period of
limitations on one theory in order to sue on both is unnecessary unless some
positive advantage can be gained by so doing. No advantage appears to be
present in this situation. The shipowner is not prejudiced by being subjected to liability for unseaworthiness for an additional period. The benefits
of a restricted period of limitations-freedom from financial concern over a
possible adverse judgment and freedom from the problems of the whereabouts, health, and memory of witnesses over an extended period-do not
accrue since liability for negligence remains.P Thus, the result reached
by the Court is desirable.
The decision expressly leaves open the question of whether state statutes
may still be applied when unseaworthiness alone is alleged. This question
will probably be of little importance in determining the rights of seamen,
since negligence can nearly always be alleged3 4 to bring the suit within the
rule of the instant case.35 It will have importance, however, for longshore36
men and other harbor workers, who are not subject to the Jones Act
but who may maintain an action for unseaworthiness. 3 7 In this situation,
32. This is often true even after the evidence has been fully presented in court.
See the excellent opinion of Judge Maris in McCarthy v. American E. Corp., 175 F2d
724, 725-27 (3d Cir. 1949).
33. Indeed, under both theories the damages are identical, for plaintiff is entitled
to recover for his injuries regardless of what theory renders the shipowner liable.
Cf. Hudgins v. Gregory, 219 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1955); McCarthy v. American E.
Corp., 175 F2d 724 (3d Cir. 1949). In addition, under both theories contributory
negligence, rather than barring the suit, is considered on a comparative basis in determining the extent to which the shipowner is liable. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,
346 U.S. 406 (1953); Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926); The Max Morris,

137 U.S. 1 (1890).

As to the relative importance of witnesses, it should be noted that the burden of
proof in unseaworthiness actions requires that the libellant show no more than that a
certain condition existed on the ship which caused his injuries, and that such condition
rendered the ship unseaworthy. See notes 9-11 su"ra. The latter point would be
proved either by expert testimony or by court precedents. Mahnich v. Southern S.S.
Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Sprague v. Texas Co., 250 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1957);
Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
On the other hand, to sustain an action under the Jones Act the libellant would have
to rely on his witnesses to prove not only that a condition existed which caused the
seaman's injury, but also that this condition existed because of negligence. See Impedal Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4, 8 (6th Cir. 1956); Pioneer S.S. Co. v. Hill,
227 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Poignant v. United States, 225 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955).
34. For example, it would be virtually impossible to prove sham joinder when
the seaman alleged that an unseaworthy condition was caused by reason of negligence,
or that it was suffered to remain by reason of negligent inspection.
35. This analysis assumes that the action will be instituted within three years of
the injury. However, if the suit were not brought until after this period, it is not
clear which law-the state statute of limitations or the maritime laches-is controlling.
The dissent said the state statute should be determinative. See note 30 supra.
36. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1949). Cf.
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1946) ; Swanson v. Marra Bros.,
328 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1946).
37. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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however, the reasoning of the majority has no application. Plaintiff is
not faced with the loss of one theory of recovery by taking the full
period for another, for only a single theory is available. Moreover, the
argument, present in the case of seamen, that the shipowner would not be
prejudiced by an extension of the period of limitations, is based on the fact
that the shipowner is subject to liability under the Jones Act for the longer
period. This argument is inapplicable here.
It is conceivable that in the future state courts may be required by
the Supreme Court to decide cases where unseaworthiness alone is alleged
on the theory of laches, rather than by applying their own statutes of
limitations. 38 Since maritime law is federal in source, state courts in entertaining unseaworthiness actions must apply federal substantive law.3 9
Although statutes of limitations are arguably procedural rather than substantive, 40 the Supreme Court has in the past evinced a willingness to compel
state courts to follow federal maritime law on other points normally considered procedural. 4 ' Such a holding, however, would probably have little
effect upon results of cases. Since the maritime courts in applying laches
analogize to the pertinent state statute of limitations,2 in the majority of
cases it would appear to make little difference whether the state court
arrives at a specific period by directly applying its statute or merely by
analogizing to it. The actual result will differ only in those cases in which
plaintiff can show both no inexcusable delay in instituting suit and a lack of
prejudice to defendant by such delay.
38. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in the instant case, states that this is the
proper method to be used in determining the period. He suggests, however, that in
applying laches the courts analogize to the Jones Act, which is extremely similar to
unseaworthiness, rather than, as they have in the past, analogizing to the state statute
of limitations. Instant case at 229. It would appear that such analogy to the Jones
Act would not be applicable in longshoremen's unseaworthiness suits, for these suits
bear no similarity at all to the seaman's Jones Act remedy.
39. See note 22 supra.
40. See GOoDRicH, CoNFLiCr oF LAws 85 (3d ed. 1949).
41. See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942), where the Court
required a state court to place the burden of proof of the validity of a seaman's release
on the shipowner, in accordance with the maritime law, rather than use its own
procedural standard which put the burden of proof of fraud in the release on the one
questioning its validity. The Court stated that deeply rooted in admiralty as that
right is, it was a part of the very substance of his claim and cannot be considered a
mere incident of a form of procedure." Id. at 249. Certainly laches is as deeply
rooted in the admiralty law. Perhaps, as is indicated in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,
346 U.S. 406, 411 (1953), the Court based its reasoning on an analogy to the Erie
doctrine of equal justice regardless of the court in which suit is instituted. It is
interesting to note that while burden of proof is considered procedural, GoomilcH,
op. cit. upra note 40, at 84, for purposes of Erie it is substantive whenever it will
affect the result. Id. § 15. Cf. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943).
Similarly, while the statute of limitations is considered procedural, see GooDRICH,
op. cit. supra note 40, at 85, for purposes of Erie, where it will have an effect on the
result, the state statute is controlling. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,
109-12 (1945). Clearly, applying laches instead of the state statute of limitations
will in some cases directly affect the permissibility of bringing suit, and therefore the
result. Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to expect the Court to apply the same
principle to the period of limitations as it has to burden of proof. Cf. Oroz v. American President Lines, Ltd., 27 U.S.L. WzzK 2174 (2d Cir. Oct. 14, 1958).
42. See cases cited note 25 supra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JuiroiA JURISDICTION OvR NoNRESIDENT TRUSTEE BY STATE OF SETTLOR'S LATER DOMICILE HELD
VioLATiW OF DUE PROCESS; FAILUR To GivE EFFECT TO SISTER
STATE JUDGMENT ON GROUND OF LACK OF JUIsDICTIoN HELD NOT
To VIOLATE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT DESPITE LITIGATION OF
JURISDICTION ISSUE IN INITIAL SUIT

In 1935 settlor, a resident of Pennsylvania, executed in Delaware a
trust instrument naming as trustee a Delaware corporation. The corpus
was composed of securities; from these settlor reserved the income for
life, remainder to such persons as she should subsequently appoint by
inter vivos or testamentary power. Settlor retained the right to change
the trustee or to amend or revoke the entire agreement at any time.' A
power of appointment executed in 1935 was replaced by another in 1939.
In 1944 settlor moved to Florida where she continued to live until her death
in 1952. During this period, trustee maintained correspondence with settlor
regarding the trust, but trustee had no other connection with the state of
Florida. In 1949, in Florida, settlor executed a power of appointment,
appointing $400,000 of the trust remainder to named beneficiaries. On the
same day, settlor executed her will, disposing in favor of named legatees
the whole residue of her estate including any interests over which she
had power of appointment which had not been effectively exercised prior to
her death. After settlor's death, her will was probated in Florida. In Delaware, trustee paid out $400,000 to other trusts in favor of beneficiaries as
2
provided by the final power of appointment. Several months later, legatees
brought suit in a Florida state court for declaratory judgment as to what
property passed under settlor's will, contending that the power of appointment was ineffective and claiming the $400,000. Personal service was had
3
upon beneficiaries, who were themselves Florida residents, and service
by mail in accordance with the Florida constructive service statute

4

was

1. Further control was assured by a provision that the trustee could sell trust
assets, make investments, and participate in certain proceedings involving the securities held in the trust only with the consent of a "trust advisor" appointed by
settlor.
2. Lewis v. Hanson, 128 A.2d 819, 824, 831 (Del. 1957).
3. Beneficiaries, for purposes of this Comment, refers to two Florida residents,
appointees of $400,000 and litigants in the suits discussed herein. The rights of other
beneficiaries, appointees of some $17,000 by the 1949 power, are not involved in the
central issues of the cases and will not be discussed.
Section 48.01(5) provides
4. Fi.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 48.01, 48.02 (1941).
for service of process by publication in a suit or proceeding "for the construction of
any will, deed, contract, or other written instrument and for a judicial declaration
or enforcement of any legal or equitable right, title, claim, lien or interest thereunder." Such service may be had, inter alia, upon "any corporation or other legal
entity, whether its domicile be foreign, domestic or unknown. . . ." FLA. STAT. ANN.
For discussion of such constructive service statutes with
tit. 6, § 48.02(2) (1941).
reference to constitutional problems of extraterritorial jurisdiction see Cleary &
Seder, Extended JurisdictionalBases for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 599
(1955); O'Connor & Goff, Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction Over NonResidents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act, 31 NoTRE DAME LAW. 223 (1956);
Note, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 79 (1958); Note, 43 VA. L. REv. 1105 (1957).
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had upon trustee. Beneficiaries moved to dismiss on grounds that under
Florida law a trustee is an indispensable party to a suit involving the trust
and that the Florida courts could not consistently with the due process
requirement of the fourteenth amendment subject to their jurisdiction the
nonresident Delaware trustee. The Florida chancery court ruled that it
lacked jurisdiction over trustee and dismissed as to it but, retaining jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and over those parties who had
been personally served and were before it, held the power of appointment
testamentary and invalid under the applicable Florida law and entered
judgment for legatees against beneficiaries. Beneficiaries took appeal to
the Florida Supreme Court. Meanwhile, after the institution of the Florida
suit but before the entry of a final decree, the executrix of settlor's estate,
herself the mother of the beneficiaries and a defendant in the Florida litigation, began a suit in the Delaware state courts seeking declaratory judgment
as to who was entitled to the trust assets held in that state. Invoking the
in rem jurisdiction of the court and serving legatees by mail, beneficiaries
sought to have the validity of the trust appointment upheld. After entry of
the Florida decree, legatees urged it as res judicata in the Delaware suit,
claiming full faith and credit for the judgment of a sister state. The
Delaware chancellor refused to accord effect to the Florida judgment, holding that Florida was without jurisdiction to decide the matter of the disposition of the trust. He further held that, under the applicable Delaware
law, the trust and power were valid and beneficiaries entitled to the
$400,000. In the Florida appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed,
holding the trust void under Florida law,- but reversed the ruling that
Florida lacked jurisdiction over trustee and thus found it unnecessary to
decide the question as to whether trustee was an indispensable party. In
the Delaware appeal, legatees again urged full faith and credit to the Florida
adjudication. The Supreme Court of Delaware found that the Florida
courts had lacked jurisdiction over trustee and that, inasmuch as trustee
was an indispensable party under Florida law, the Florida judgment was
void in Florida and entitled to no credit in Delaware. Applying Delaware
law to the trust and the power of appointment, the court affirmed the judgment of the Delaware chancellor in favor of beneficiaries., The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in both causes and heard the two
together. The Court held that Florida could not without violation of
fourteenth amendment due process exercise jurisdiction over the Delaware
trustee and that, trustee being under Florida law an indispensable party to
the suit, the Florida judgment must be reversed. Upon the same reasoning
the Delaware judgment was affirmed; Delaware was not required to give
5. The trust was held invalid on the ground that too much control had been
retained by the settlor, and the power was held ineffective in itself to transfer interests as lacking requisite testamentary formalities. Florida law was applied on the
theory that the power of appointment, executed in Florida, constituted a "republication" of the entire trust agreement. Hanson v. Denckla, 100 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1956).
6. Lewis v. Hanson, 128 A.2d 819 (Del. 1957). The decision of the chancery
court is reported as Hanson v. Wilmington Trust Co., 119 A.2d 901 (Del. Ch. 1955).
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credit to a Florida judgment void for want of jurisdiction. Four dissenting
members of the Court argued that trustee had had sufficient minimum
contacts with the state of Florida to be subject to suit in its courts. One
opinion, by three of the dissenters, further argued that even were the
majority correct on the jurisdiction issue, the Supreme Court should not
itself decide the important question of Florida law reserved by the Florida
court and by affirming the Delaware judgment, now res judicata in Florida,
finally dispose of a determinative issue of Florida law over the head of
the highest state court. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
The Court's handling of the jurisdiction issue is especially important
in the light of McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,7 decided earlier this
term. In McGee a resident of California brought action in the California
state courts upon a life insurance policy, serving defendant, a Texas corporation, by mail in Texas. Defendant's only relation with California was
the policy upon which plaintiff brought suit. That policy had been assumed
by defendant by contract with another company; defendant had subsequently mailed to the insured in California a policy of reinsurance upon
which it received premiums mailed in California during a period of two
years. On these facts, the United States Supreme Court sustained California's jurisdiction over the insurer. The opinion by Mr. Justice Black for
a unanimous Court lauded the evolution of the concept of jurisdictional
due process from the early now-discarded physical power theory of Pennoyer v. Neffs requiring personal service within the territorial boundaries
of the state as requisite for a valid in personam judgment, to the modern
formulation of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,9 requiring only
"certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "10 The
opinion, appearing to derive only collateral support from such factors as
the state's peculiar interest in protecting its residents from nonpayment by
outstate insurers 11 and the fact of active pursuit and consummation by
defendant of contractual relations within the state, seemed to hold that the
correspondence maintained by defendant concerning the insurance of its
single California policyholder sufficed to meet the "minimum contacts"
7. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
8. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For discussions of the role of International Shoe in
the development of the Court's constitutional doctrine of extraterritorial service see
Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. REv.
522; Hoffman, Plastic Frontiers of State Judicial Power Over Non-Residents:
McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Company, 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 291 (1958);
Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-Residents in Our Federal System,
43 CORNELL L.Q. 196 (1958) ; Wham, An Expanding Concept: Jurisdiction Over NonResidents, 44 A.B.A.J. 422 (1958); Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 381 (1955); Note,
43 VA.L. REv. 1105 (1957).
10. 326 U.S. at 316.
11. The particular vulnerability of outstate insurers to long-arm service had been
earlier recognized. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n,

339 U.S. 643, 647-49 (1950).
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test.12 Thus, the majority opinion in the instant case, which explains and
distinguishes McGee on the particular grounds of protection of insureds
and of active solicitation, 1 limits the potentially "enormous" 14 impact of
the earlier decision. In the course of its continuing defection from the
Pennoyer doctrine a majority 15 of the Court appears at least temporarily to
have reached the end of its tether. It reaffirms the fundamental principle
of "territorial limitations on the power of the respective States," "3 and
demands as a minimal requisite for the exercise of that power "some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws." 17 In drawing the line between the instant case and
McGee 's the Court is following its earlier admonition that the issue of
what contacts will consistently with due process subject a defendant to
the jurisdiction of the courts of a state is a question to be narrowly decided
on the facts of each particular case. 19 It is not surprising that the instant
case should fall on the far side of the line of permissible state reach. The
situation of a trustee is not analogous to that of the nonresident party to a
commercial contract. In the instant case legatees sought to invoke the
jurisdiction of Florida in rem as well as in personam, arguing that Florida,
as the state of domicile of the settlor of a trust of intangibles was the situs
of the trust and could control trust assets. In rejecting this argument, the
United States Supreme Court pointed out that the trust instrument had been
executed in Delaware and that the documents evidencing ownership of trust
property were held in Delaware by a Delaware trustee who was the obligee
20
Reliance
of the credit instruments and the record owner of the stock.
12. "It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a
contract which had substantial connection with that state." 355 U.S. at 223. See
Hoffman, supra note 9, at 304.
13. Instant case at 252-53.
14. Hoffman, supra note 9, at 304.
15. The four dissenting Justices refuse to draw the line of legitimate jurisdiction
between McGee and the instant case. Mr. Justice Black, for three dissenters, argues
that the trustee's choosing "to maintain business relations with Mrs. Donner in that
State for eight years, regularly communicating with her with respect to the business
of the trust" clearly satisfies the minimum standards test. Instant case at 259. Mr.
Justice Douglas' separate dissent, which would treat the trustees as agents of
settlor for due process purposes, is in the same vein. Id. at 263-64. Justice Black's
opinion also stresses the interest of the state of Florida in the adjudication of questions involving the Florida-drawn will of a Florida domiciliary. These interests are
invoked to subject to Florida jurisdiction a non-resident trustee who is "little more
than a custodian." Id. at 257. The Douglas opinion similarly typifies trustee as
"purely and simply a stakeholder." Id. at 263. When it is noted that legatees sought
in Delaware a $400,000 personal judgment against trustee on the basis of the Florida
adjudication, the argument for Florida's jurisdiction over trustee based on settlor's
connection with that state appears less convincing. See case cited note 2 supra.
16. Instant case at 251.
17. Id. at 253.
18. The majority opinion concedes that "from Florida Mrs. Donner carried on
several bits of trust administration that may be compared to the mailing of premiums
in McGee." Id. at 252.
19. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
20. Instant case at 247 n.17.
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upon such indices of situs for purposes of jurisdiction in rem seems dearly
the more reasonable view.2 ' It permits the settlor of an inter vivos trust to
select with some assurance the jurisdiction whose law and whose courts he
will have protect the interests of his beneficiaries, 22 securing by the establishment of the trust those rules of law by which it will be governed without fear
of alteration due to his own subsequent peregrinations. But if this rule is a
good one, it should not be vitiated by a flanking maneuver which gives to a
state of settlor's later domicile in personam jurisdiction over the trustee
merely on the basis of the maintenance of the trust relationship and of
trustee's routine correspondence with the settlor concerning the trust.23
A delicate full faith and credit problem is also posed by the particular
course of litigation in this case. In its broad outlines, the requirements of
the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution 2 4 as regards the
judicial proceedings of the several states are clear.
give to the final judgment

25

A state is required to

of a sister state the same effect, 2 6 including res

21. Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933); see GOODRICH, CoNFLIcT OF LAws 491-93 (3d ed. 1949); STUMBERG, CONFLIcr OF LAWS 434-36 (2d ed.

1951) ; Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws, 44 HARv. L. REv.
161, 195 (1930); Dean, Conflict Avoidance in Inter Vivos Trusts of Movables, 21
LAW & CoNTEmp. PROB.

483 (1956).

22. Maximum protection for such a trust lies in assuring not only that the
law of the chosen state shall control, but that that law shall be applied in only the
most convenient and most expert court.
23. A state of later domicile may of course be interested in the protection of
such legitimate domestic interests as those of local descendants or local creditors
of settlor. Adequate protection of these interests would demand taking of jurisdiction, both judicial and legislative, over a nonresident trustee and trust. Against
such interests must be balanced the perilous instability to which any trust would thus
be subjected as its settlor moved from state to state. And consider also that to
subject trustee to the in personam jurisdiction of a given state would make trustee
potentially liable in its courts not only to the local groups enumerated above, but to
all other interested parties as well, including settlor himself.
24. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved and the effect thereof." The congressional enactment passed under the implementing authority of this clause provides that acts,
records and judicial proceedings "shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by
law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they
are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952).
25. A judgment may be "final" for this purpose even though it has been appealed,
so long as the filing of appeal does not operate to vacate the judgment below. GOODR iCH, op. cit. supra note 21, at 628-29; RESTATEMENT, CONFICT OF LAWS, Explanatory
Notes § 438, comment a (1934) ; Note, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 878, 880-84 (1941). Courts
of the second jurisdiction will ordinarily stay proceedings pending termination of
appeal in the first. Ibid. If this rule is true where second suit is upon the judgment rendered in the first, a fortiori it should apply where res judicata effect of the
first is urged in the second. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, Explanatory Notes
§ 41, comment d at 163-64 (1942). In the instant case, the Florida appeal did not
serve to vacate the judgment of the Florida chancery court. See provisions for
spersedeas, FLA. Sup. CT. R. 19, applied to declaratory judgment actions in
Lockleer v. City of West Palm Beach, 50 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1951).
26. Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230
(1908); Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813). See Corwin, The "Full
Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 371 (1933); Jackson, Full Faith
and Credit-Tle Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1, 7-10

266

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107

judicata effect,2 7 that that judgment has in the sister state itself. But only
valid judgments need be given such effect; a state may refuse,28 and indeed
under the commands of due process must refuse,2 9 to honor the judgment
of a sister state which is void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant or the subject matter of the action. The usual instance of
such jurisdictional failure is the entry of a default judgment against a defendant by the courts of a state with which that defendant may not have had
sufficient contact to give them in personam jurisdiction over him.30 When
such a judgment is sought to be enforced in another state, defendant may
raise the defense that the courts of the first state lacked jurisdiction to enter
the judgment, and such a defense will be heard by the courts of the enforcing
state,2 ' subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States. The
instant case differs significantly, however, from this classical paradigm.
Here it is not the trustee, as defendant, who is asserting a lack of personal
jurisdiction over a party by the Florida courts. It is the beneficiaries who
claim that the Florida judgment is void for want of jurisdiction over the
subject matter because of lack of in personam jurisdiction over trustee,
alleged indispensable party under local Florida law. The validity or voidness of the Florida judgment, as to beneficiaries, is not itself a question of
federal constitutional law; had Florida chosen to hold that, as a matter of
Florida law, trustee was not an indispensable party to this suit,3 2 the Florida
judgment against beneficiaries would have been unassailable on constitutional grounds and wholly entitled to full faith and credit. Thus Delaware's
refusal of full faith and credit to the Florida judgment may not be supported on the grounds that the Florida judgment is itself everywhere
(1945); Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit, 29 VA.
L. REv. 557 (1943); Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System, 20 MINN.
L. REv. 140 (1936).

27. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438-41 (1943); Milliken v.

Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349
(1942) (dictum). See RorrscHAE.ma, CoNsTrruioNAL. LAw 138-40 (1939); Reese,
Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IowA L. REv. 183, 186 (1957).
28. Riley v. New York Trust Co., supra note 27; Baker v. Baker, Eccles &
Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917) ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) ; D'Arcy v. Ketchum,
52 U.S. (11 How.) 174 (1850).
29. Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Baker v. Baker,
Eccles & Co., supra note 28, at 403 (dictum). See Costigan, The History of the
Adoption of Section I of Article IV of the United States Constitution and a Consideration of the Effect on Judgments of That Section and of Federal Legislation,
4 COLum. L. Rxv. 470, 486-88 (1904) ; Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith
and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153, 166 (1949).
30. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) ; Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) ; Baker v. Baker,
Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917); Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204
U.S. 8 (1907); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S.
(11 How.) 174 (1850). Cf. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942);
Pink v. AAA Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941).
31. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873) ; and cases cited note 30 supra. See 2 STORY,
CoNsTiTuT oN § 1313 (5th ed. 1891).
32. The lower Florida court, in dismissing as to trustee but retaining jurisdiction
over the subject matter as to the parties before it, appears to have so held.
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void as violative of the federal constitution; it may be supported only on
the grounds that, once Florida's assumption of jurisdiction over the trustee
has failed because of requirements of federal due process, the judgment
would itself be void and of no effect in Florida by operation of the local law
of indispensability. Where, as in this situation, the effect of the state
judgment turns ultimately upon an issue of Florida state law, a battery of
new considerations comes to bear upon the full faith and credit issue.
Ordinarily if a party discovered himself a defendant in the courts of a
state which he felt could not consistently with federal due process bind
him by its judgment, he might have alternative remedies. He might go
into the courts of that state and contest the issue of jurisdiction, seeking
review of the rulings of that state's courts, if necessary, by the United States
Supreme Court. Or he might stay home and fight the jurisdictional battle
in the courts of his own home state when plaintiff sought enforcement of
the original judgment under full faith and credit. But if the incorporation
of the concept of territorial limitation of state jurisdiction within due process
requirements has any meaning at all, it is that we are reluctant to force a
party to travel to a foreign jurisdiction with which he has had no contacts,
there to try issues upon which his liability depends.s3 Since it would be as
unfair to require a party to go into a foreign state of suit to try jurisdictional,
questions as to try any other questions, it would be obviously unreasonable to
force defendant in the above situation to take the first of his available
remedies. Therefore we say that he may at his election sit home and attack
the jurisdiction of the foreign courts collaterally in subsequent action in
his own state.3 4 But what if the defendant himself chooses to enter the
foreign courts and there litigate the jurisdiction issue? There is precedent
for the proposition that defendant, once he has litigated the issue in the
state of original suit, may not relitigate it and again attack jurisdiction in a
subsequent suit at home, that on the jurisdiction question, as on the merits,
the original judgment is res judicata.35 Certainly such a rule is most
consonant with the whole purpose of full faith and credit: 3 that parties
shall not be free to again fight out the same issues, whenever they happen
to meet in different states.3 7 If a defendant enters the courts of a foreign
33. See Sobeloff, supra note 9, at 204-05.
34. See text and note at note 31 supra.
35. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305
U.S. 165 (1938). Cf. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); Sherrer v.
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945) (dictum). See also Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940) ; Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). And see Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry,
244 U.S. 25 (1917).
36. See RorrscHAEPm, op. cit. supra note 27, at 141-42; Moore & Oglebay, supra
note 26, at 572-73.
37. "This clause of the Constitution brings to our union a useful means for
ending litigation. Matters once decided between adverse parties in any state or
territory are at rest. Were it not for this full faith and credit provision, as far as
the Constitution controls the matter, adversaries could wage again their legal battles
whenever they met in other jurisdictions." Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S.
343, 349 (1942).
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state to litigate jurisdiction, it seems not unreasonable to demand that he
litigate it once and for all, carrying his appeal as far as the United States
Supreme Court if necessary but, upon failure so to appeal, waiving any
right of subsequent review. The alternative course involves all the friction
and waste effort of multiple trials in two jurisdictions. Similarly, where
defendant's objection is not as to the court's jurisdiction over his person
but as to its jurisdiction over the subject matter, it seems not unfair to
require him to make that objection within the court of initial suit itself.
Like the party who has chosen to enter the state, this defendant is validly
before its courts.38 It is no more unreasonable to make him litigate there
than to make any other defendant litigate who has been personally served
with process within the territorial boundaries of the state. Often, where
his objection to jurisdiction goes to only a part of the subject of the suit,
he will have to appear to protect his other local interests. Certainly, at
the least, where like beneficiaries in the instant case he actually does appear,
does litigate jurisdiction, and even prosecutes an appeal of jurisdiction to
the highest state court, to refuse him later opportunity to readjuicate that
issue deprives him of no essential right. Especially in this case, where
not only federal issues but questions of local law as well are determinative
of the jurisdiction issue, the more reasonable scheme seems that which
restricts defendant's right to try those issues to the courts of the state where
suit originates, with possible review, of course, of all federal questions by
the United States Supreme Court. Here the issue of Florida's jurisdiction
turns ultimately upon the Florida law of indispensable parties. In our
federal system the question as to which court should decide this Florida
law is itself a consideration of weight.
The Supreme Court's holding that Delaware is here not obligated to
accord effect to the Florida litigation, at least to the extent of staying all
Delaware proceedings pending a final adjudication of the cause between the
parties in Florida,39 means first of all that the Delaware Supreme Court
or the United States Supreme Court may well be the court which decides
Florida law, although the Florida court is itself immediately available for
that determination as between these parties. Moreover, it will be for the
defendant to select which court will adjudicate the Florida law, and in that
power of selection itself there may lie an inequitable tactical advantage.
Suppose that, no suit having been instituted in Delaware, the Florida case
had gone as far as decision by the Florida Supreme Court, holding for
38. It should be noted that in the case of the nonresident defendant who enters
the courts of a state to challenge their jurisdiction over him, it is not his free election
which is the determinative consideration in holding that he may not subsequently
relitigate jurisdiction. Practically, such a defendant may in fact be compelled to
contest jurisdiction in the state of original suit rather than by subsequent collateral
attack, under pain of suffering a conclusive default judgment on the merits. What is
significant is the consideration that, having once litigated an issue, voluntarily or under
compulsion, defendant should not be able to force a wasteful and unnecessary relitigation of it.
39. See note 25 supra.
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legatees both on the issue of jurisdiction and on the merits. Beneficiaries
are now free to pursue either of two courses. They may appeal the jurisdiction issue to the Supreme Court of the United States. If that court
reverses as to Florida's assumption of jurisdiction over trustee, the Florida
court will have to decide the indispensability issue. Or beneficiaries may
now start suit for declaratory judgment in Delaware, contending invalidity
of the Florida judgment for want of jurisdiction. In this suit, it would be
for Delaware or for the United States Supreme Court to ascertain the
effect in Florida of a judgment rendered in the absence of trustee. But
because the judicial processes by which a foreign court may legitimately
arrive at Florida law differ greatly from those which a domestic court may
apply in ruling on that same law, beneficiaries now have their pick of two
very different forums. 40 Consider also that beneficiaries choose their forum
after full adjudication on the merits in Florida. They already know that
the best result beneficiaries can get in Florida is a dismissal for want of
jurisdiction, that there may be a tendency of the Florida justices to
stretch reason in favor of legatees who have already established what they
think is a meritorious claim. Should beneficiaries take the issue to Delaware, however, they will obtain a fresh ruling on jurisdiction, biased, if at
all, in their favor by the aura of a Florida judgment which, by hypothesis,
has reached too far in taking in trustee. Under these circumstances, are
they likely to entrust the adjudication of indispensability to the same Florida
court which has already signified its substantial conclusions for legatees?
On the other hand, had beneficiaries themselves won on the merits in
Florida, legatees could neither seek review in the United States Supreme
Court nor attack the adverse judgment collaterally by Delaware proceedings.
Having invoked the jurisdiction of the Florida courts and overcome beneficiaries' argument of jurisdictional incompetence, legatees would be estopped
from now denying Florida's jurisdiction following a defeat on the merits.
The effect, then, of a rule that Delaware need in these circumstances give
no credit to the Florida proceedings not only permits a wasteful multiplicity
of litigation, but encourages an interested party to seek out, to his own
advantage, a forum less qualified to give judgment on the particular rule
of law in issue. Or if that party chooses to attack the original judgment
both directly and collaterally, as in the instant case, there is the disquieting
perspective of a two-way race up the appellate ladders of the respective
jurisdictions toward a first final adjudication by the United States Supreme
Court.
It is very possible that the majority of the Court were influenced in
their full faith and credit determination by an understandable reluctance to
permit the Florida courts, by application of Florida law, to upset a trust
whose whole legal existence heretofore centered in Delaware. It is in fact
unfortunate that the Florida courts chose to apply Florida and not Dela40. A foreign court passing on an issue of domestic law would consider itself
tightly bound by authoritative domestic precedent. The highest domestic court, passing on the same issue, is of course entirely free to overrule its old books.
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ware substantive law to determine the validity of the Delaware trust;
Florida's choice of Florida law appears violative of the more reasonable conflict-of-laws principles 41 although probably not so egregious as to be violative of federal due process.4
As a matter of rough justice between the
litigants, it would seem clearly desirable to overturn such a judgment. But
that a decision is most equitable does not mean that it is most wise. In the
determination of constitutional questions, especially those involving the
interrelations of the several federated states, decisions ex aequo et bono
between the immediate parties should be eschewed in favor of larger considerations aimed at achieving the optimum functioning of the federal system
for the widest number of cases.43 Such an aim, in the instant case, seems to
call for a reversal of the Delaware judgment with orders to give such effect
to the Florida adjudication as will at least stay the Delaware proceedings
until the Supreme Court of Florida has definitively put to rest between these
parties the determinative issue of Florida law.

COURTS-MARTIAL- CvmN EMPLOYEE
TARY

INSTALLATIONS

AT

OVERSEAS MiiI-

HELD NOT TRABLE BY COURT-MIARTIAL IN

No,T-CAPITAL CASE
An American citizen employed by the United States Air Force at a
base in Morocco was charged with larceny of government property.' After
conviction by a general court-martial, he sought a writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 2 charging
that the military authorities lacked jurisdiction over his person. The district
court denied relief, holding that article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of
4
Military Justice (UCMJ) - granted valid jurisdiction to the military.

41. Preferably Delaware law should govern. Some courts would apply the law
of Pennsylvania, the domicile of the settlor at the time of creation of the trust. See
authorities cited note 21 .tpra. The Florida court's rationale of "republication," see
note 5 supra, seems poorly reasoned.
42. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 306 U.S. 493,
500-02 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 294 U.S. 532
(1935); GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 21, at 31-33; STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 21,
at 58-68; Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 581
(1953) ; Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court To Review State Decisions in the
Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1926); Ross, "Full Faith and
Credit" in a Federal System, 20 MINN. L. REv. 140 (1936) ; Ross, Has the Conflict
of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?, 15 MINN. L. REV. 161 (1931).
43. See Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955);
dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500,
524 (1957); Address of Chief Justice Vinson before the American Bar Association,
Sept. 7, 1949, 69 Sup. Ct. v, vi; Address of Chief Justice Hughes before the American Law Institute, May 10, 1934, in 11 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE 313, 315.
1. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 121, 10 U.S.C. § 921 (Supp. V, 1958).
2. United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 158 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C.
1958).
3. 10 U.S.C. § 802 (Supp. V, 1958).
4. The district court granted a hearing over the government's objection that
petitioner had not exhausted all his remedies. The United States Court of Military
Appeals did not act until June 9, 1958, after the case had been submitted to the circuit
court on appeal. See instant case at 11 n.8 (instant case references herein are to the
court's opinion).
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The court of appeals reversed, holding that civilian employees are not subject to trial by court-martial in non-capital cases.6 United States ex rel.
Guagliardov. McElroy, No. 14304, D.C. Cir., Sept. 12, 1958.
Pursuant to its authority to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,6 Congress provided in article 2 of the
UCMJ 7 that: "persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the

armed forces outside the United States" are subject to military jurisdiction.
The legislative history of this subsection indicates that Congress intended
that civilian dependents,8 as well as employees 9 of the military, were to be
subject to the UCMJ. Although historically jurisdiction over both classes
of civilians during time of war has been sustained, 10 the extent to which the
subsection will be upheld during peacetime is subject to considerable doubt.
Prior to 1957, the military and federal district courts had taken the position
2
that both classes were subject to military jurisdiction." In Reid v.Covert,
however, the Supreme Court held that a civilian dependent overseas could
not be tried by court-martial for a capital offense. Although six Justices
4
8
concurred in the holding of the case,' there was no opinion of the Court,1

5. The government in both the district court and the circuit court contended
that the petitioner had prematurely raised the jurisdictional question as the courtmartial proceedings had not received final review either by the Judge Advocate
General's Office or the Court of Military Appeals. The district court in rejecting
the contention relied on the Supreme Court's action in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957), in which a writ of habeas corpus was granted when retrial in the military
courts was still pending. Id. at 4. Judge Holtzoff concluded that the rule in
Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950), had been overturned sub silentio by the
Court's decision in Reid and their action in the earlier case, United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). The circuit court distinguished the Gusick
case on the grounds that there the attack was not on jurisdictional grounds but
merely collateral in that it was aimed at error in the proceedings. Thus the circuit
court view is that jurisdiction may be directly attacked at any time, but a petitioner must exhaust all remedies before seeking review for other reasons.
6. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.

7. 10 U.S.C. § 802 (Supp. V, 1958).
8. INDEX AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, THE UNImORur CODE OF MILITARY JUsTICE

873-76 (1950).
9. Id. at 874. The major change made from the original draft was the deletion
of the phrase "or under the supervision of." It was urged that this was too broad
in scope and might easily be construed to include the civilian population of Guam
and Samoa, then under the control of the Navy.

10. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) ; instant case at 6.

In time of war the

question is significantly different. See Note, 71 HARV. L. REV. 712 (1958).

11. In re Varney, 141 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (employee in Japan falsified

lease in order to get rental allowance for civilian quarters) ; United States v. Burney,
6 U.S.C.M.A. 776, 21 C.M.R. 98 (1956) (employee attacked and injured co-worker
in Japan).

12. 354 U.S. 1 (1957), rehearing and reversing 351 U.S. 487 (1956) and Kinsella
v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956).
13. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan voted to deny court-martial jurisdiction
but wrote separate concurring opinions limiting their view to capital cases only.
Justices Black and Brennan and Chief Justice Warren joined in Justice Black's opinion which did not limit the issue.
14. Justices Clark and Burton dissented and Justice Whittaker did not participate.
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and the various views expressed by the several Justices have given rise to
considerable speculation as to when, if ever, the military can constitutionally
be given jurisdiction over civilians in time of peace. 15 Four members of the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, held that Congress' power under
clause 1416 extended only to those persons who could fairly be considered
"in" the land or naval forces.17 While recognizing that some persons could
be "in the armed forces without having been formally inducted or wearing
the uniform," 18 these members concluded that overseas dependents were
not. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, in separate concurring opinions,
stated that while military trial of civilians was reasonably related to Congress' power under clause 14, that power was outweighed, in capital cases
involving dependents, by the procedural safeguards accorded individuals
under article III and the fifth and sixth amendments.' 9 Two members of
the Court dissented on the ground that the statute was a reasonable exercise
of Congress' clause 14 powers and emphasized the fact that, in their view,
no reasonable alternative existed.20 Subsequently, two district courts 21
and the United States Court of Military Appeals,22 in interpreting the Reid
decision, have accepted the Government's distinction between the relationship of a dependent and that of an employee who by the nature of his
duties is more closely connected with the "mission" of the armed forces.
These courts have concluded that employees are subject to military
jurisdiction23
The Reid decision presented the problem of finding some constitutional
means by which civilians at extra-continental military bases could be subjected to criminal jurisdiction. The various alternatives which have been
considered 24 leave much to be desired. Inducting employees "into" the
armed forces might be sufficient to satisfy the Reid rule,2 but such a
procedure would probably operate only to discourage civilians from enter15. E.g., Note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 712 (1958) ; 56 MIcH. L. REv. 287 (1958). Cf.
Judge Follmer's opinion in Grisham v. Taylor, 161 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1958),
and Judge Quinn's opinion in United States v. Wilson, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 60, 25 C.M.R.
322 (1958).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
17. 354 U.S. at 23-25.
18. Id. at 23.
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI. Trial by jury and
indictment by a grand jury are not constitutionally required in courts-martial. Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
20. See note 14 supra.
21. Grisham v. Taylor, 161 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (murder of wife by
employee stationed in France); United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 158
F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1958) (instant case).
22. United States v. Wilson, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 60, 25 C.M.R. 322 (1958) (employee
committed indecent acts while stationed in Germany).
23. See notes 21, 22 supra.
24. See Note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 712 (1958) ; 56 MIcH. L. Ray. 287 (1958).
25. Trial by jury and indictment by grand jury would then not be applicable
to their trial. Instant case at 22 (dissenting opinion).
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ing government service. Nor do any of the various alternatives to military
trial solve the problem. Trial in the United States does not appear feasible.
Under present law, the federal district courts lack jurisdiction over foreign
offenses. With but few exceptions, 26 federal criminal statutes are inapplicable to extraterritorial acts and crimes committed abroad are thus not
"offenses against the United States" which the district courts as presently
constituted can try.2 7 Nor do these courts have concurrent jurisdiction
of offenses against the UCMJ.2 8 Congressional action would thus be required to give the district courts subject-matter jurisdiction. Even with
such action, however, the practical problems of extraditing the offender 2
and compelling the attendance of foreign witnesses,3 0 the prohibitions against
depositions in criminal cases, 31 the expense of transporting witnesses, and
the applicability of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-the bail
provision in particular 3 -- appear insurmountable. Nor does the establishment of roving article III courts appear a workable solution. Such courts
would probably be offensive to the foreign nation involved.p In addition,
the practical difficulty of recruiting a grand jury to obtain an indictment
and another jury to try the case, evidently a constitutional necessity under
the Reid holding, would be troublesome at best and almost impossible in
such remote areas as Antarctica and Thailand. This alternative, too, would
require congressional action to establish a system of courts and to provide
a substantive criminal code applicable to civilians abroad.
Under present law, the only available alternative is to leave criminal
enforcement to the courts of the foreign nations. 3 ' Although constitutionally
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1952) and 10 U.S.C. § 821 (Supp. V, 1958).

27. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1952).
28. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (Supp. V, 1958).
29. Our present treaties and agreements provide for primary jurisdiction or
"waiver" only for military trial. Agreement Between the Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, [1953] 4 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846. Agreements similar to the NATO provisions have
been concluded with some forty-three other nations. Under our other treaties extradition is not provided for. E.g., France. See Note, 71 HARV. L. Rxv. 712 (1958).
Thus, a whole series of new arrangements would be required if civilian, as opposed to
military, jurisdiction is essential.
30. The United States lacks the power to require the attendance of essential
foreign nationals in our courts.
31. Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (dictum); United
1953) (dictum); cf. FED. R.
States v. Haderlein, 118 F. Supp. 346, 347 (N.D. Ill.
Ciam. P. 15, providing for depositions only on motion of defendants.
32. Waiver of indictment in "open court" after the defendant has been fully
apprised of his rights is required by FED. R. Cam. P. 7(b). FED. R. CRIm. P. 23(a)
requires "court approval" for waiver of a trial by jury. The Supreme Court has
previously asserted that "waiver" of fundamental rights must be surrounded by
safeguards. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 267 (1942), and
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
33. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Congress by a joint resolution on
August 1, 1956, 70 Stat 773, provided for the relinquishment of all consular jurisdiction. Morocco was one of the countries where such jurisdiction was exercised.
Jurisdiction was formally ended on Oct. 6, 1956. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1956, p. 1,
col. 6.
34. Cf. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1956).
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permissible, 35 this alternative is open to many objections. Many offenses
under the UCMJ are not incorporated in the criminal codes of foreign
nations and would thus go unpunished. 6 Moreover, the willingness of a
foreign government to police conduct, like that involved in the instant case,
which is not directed against it or its citizens is questionable. Finally, and
perhaps most important, is the fact that criminal procedure in foreign courts
would in many cases subject the citizen to a more severe deprivation of what
the American system of justice views as fundamental rights than he would
receive as the minimum consistent with military due process in courtsmartial. 7
The instant court avoided a determination of whether civilian employees
abroad could constitutionally be tried by courts-martial in non-capital
cases.38 It reasoned that in capital cases, the constitutional rights which
the Supreme Court in Reid held essential for overseas dependents were
equally essential for employees.3 9 Although recognizing that the concurring Justices restricted their holding to capital cases, the court concluded
that, since article 2(11) does not in terms distinguish between capital and
non-capital cases, it was not within their province to "rewrite" the statutory
phrase "employed by" along those lines. 4° In the court's view, even if
Congress could constitutionally subject some civilians to military jurisdiction
in non-capital cases, the statute as written did not indicate an intent to
41
do so.
To the extent that the instant court's decision is based on the conclusion that Congress has failed to distinguish between capital and noncapital cases, it can be overturned by amendment of the UCMJ, thus
restoring jurisdiction over most, if not all,42 civilian offenses. Whether
such restoration would be long-lived, however, is questionable. Under
Justice Black's view, the distinction is immaterial; the full protection of the
Bill of Rights must be accorded everyone who is not "in" the armed forces.
In the federal courts, these protections are equally applicable in capital and,
except for very minor offenses,4 in non-capital cases. It thus seems likely
35. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Wilson v. Girard, supra note 34.
36. See instant case at 19 (dissenting opinion).
37. Although "due process" in military courts is not the same as that in other
courts, there are certain minimum requirements. See United States v. Wilson, 9
U.S.C.M.A. 60, 25 C.M.R. 322 (1958). The civilian Military Court of Appeals
grants review of all court-martial proceedings in which there is error alleged.
38. "This is not to say that legislation bringing some civilian employees within
court-martial jurisdiction for some offenses would necessarily be unconstitutional."
Instant case at 6.
39. Instant case at 3-6.
40. Instant case at 6.
41. Ibid.
42. Even though the offense is punishable by death under the Table of Maximum
Punishments, the convening authority may direct that it be treated as non-capital, thus
precluding the possibility of a death sentence.

MANUAL FOR

CouRTs-MAaRIAL 33j (1)

(1951). It would seem that by so directing, the convening authority could bring
virtually all cases involving civilians overseas within the jurisdiction of the military
if the capital-non-capital distinction is adopted.
43. The right to trial by jury does not apply to petty offenses. Fmn. R. Clam.
P. 2 3(a) ; Shick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1903).
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that an amendment to the UCMJ distinguishing between the two types of
cases would survive only until a non-capital case reached the Supreme Court.
It is possible that, in a future case, the Supreme Court will distinguish
between dependents and employees. Even the majority in Reid recognizes
44
that it is possible to be "in" the service without wearing the uniform.
In view of the fact that civilian employees in one sense merely replace uniformed servicemen, performing work which even in the lowest echelons
is an integral part of the over-all plan of operation, such a distinction might
be proper. Moreover, the distinction has support in history. Persons
working with the armed forces were regarded as being subject to military
jurisdiction at the time the Constitution was adopted. 45 Dependents, on
the other hand, have been so subject only since 1916.46 Finally, the relatively greater importance of the role of employees, as opposed to dependents,
in fulfilling the mission of the armed forces renders the distinction supportable under the test advocated by the concurring and dissenting justices.
By withdrawing all civilians from military jurisdiction, at least under
present law, the instant decision aggravates the problem presented the armed
forces by Reid. The undesirability of relying solely on the courts of
foreign nations to try civilian members of the overseas military component
seems to require the adoption of some system of American jurisdiction over
them. Such a system, if one is constitutionally and practically possible,
can of course be implemented only through congressional action, which
action is likely to be ineffective in the absence of judicial guidance as to what
is constitutionally permissible. The instant decision fails to provide such
a guide. It is to be hoped that it will be provided by the Supreme Court in
a future clarification of the rule established in the Reid case.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-UiFom
ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FRom
UNCONSTITUTIONIAL BY STATE COURT

ACT To

WITHOUT

A

SECURE THE
STATE HELD

In accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Act To Secure the
Attendance of Witnesses From Without a State,1 a New York judge filed
a certificate in a Florida circuit court requesting that one O'Neill, wanted
as a witness in a grand jury proceeding, be seized and delivered to an officer
of New York. The request was refused on the ground that the Uniform
44. See text accompanying note 18 supra.

45. 2 JOURNAL, CONTINENTAL CONG. 116 (1775); 5 JOURNAL, CONTINENTAL
See United States v.
CONG. 800 (1776). See Articles of War, 2 Stat. 366 (1806).
Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 776, 21 C.M.R. 98 (1956).
46. In 1916 Congress added the words "persons accompanying" to the revised
Articles of War. Articles of War art. 2(d), 39 Stat 651 (1916) (now 10 U.S.C.
§2(11) (1952)).

1. N.Y.

CODE CRIM. PROC.

§ 618-a; 9 U.L.A. 91 (1957).
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Act as adopted in Florida 2 violated the federal constitution and Florida law.
On appeal, the State supreme court affirmed. Application of New York,
100 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1958), cert. granted, 356 U.S. 972 (1958) (No. 939,
1957 Term; renumbered No. 53, 1958 Term).
The Uniform Act, adopted in its present form by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1936-8 and presently in
force with minor variations in forty-three states, 4 was designed to meet the
need for reciprocal state legislation to aid the state in the efficient administration of criminal justice. The act provides two methods for securing the
attendance of witnesses for either criminal prosecutions or grand jury investigations. The first method, like the second, is initiated by the filing of a
certificate with the court of the foreign state in which the witness is believed
to be located, setting out the circumstances of the request. Under the first
procedure, the judge in the foreign state has a notice of hearing served on
the individual named in the certificate. A hearing is then held to determine
that the witness is material and his presence necessary, that attendance will
not cause undue hardship, and that the requesting state and any state
through which the witness will travel shall exempt him from arrest and
service of process. Upon so finding, he issues a summons directing the
witness to attend and testify in the court of the requesting state. Under
the second procedure, if the requesting state recommends that the witness
be taken into immediate custody and delivered thereto, the foreign judge
may,
"in lieu of notification of the hearing, direct that such witness be forthwith brought before him for said hearing; and . . . being satisfied of
the desirability of such custody and delivery . . . may, in lieu of
issuing subpoena or summons, order that the said witness be forthwith
taken into custody and delivered to an officer of the requesting state." ,
The New Jersey Supreme Court has declared that, because of the provisions
for immunity from service and arrest and the determination of hardship and
materiality at the hearing, interstate rendition of witnesses is not a deprivation of liberty without due process. 6 The instant court is the first state
supreme court to declare the Uniform Act unconstitutional. 7 Considering
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 942 (1944).
3. Uniform Law Commissionwrs' Prefatory Note, FLA.

4.

STAT. ANN.

§ 942 (1944).

COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL

44 (rev. ed. 1955).
5. FLA. STAT. ANN. §942.02 (1944).
6. It re Cooper, 127 N.J.L. 312, 22 A.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
7. A Pennsylvania county court declared the Uniform Act invalid as a violation of a provision of the state constitution requiring the subject of a bill to be
clearly expressed in its title, and as abridging the privileges and immunities clause
of the fourteenth amendment. It re Allen, 49 Pa. D. & C. 631 (Q.S. 1940). The
act has since been reenacted under a new title. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §622
(Supp. 1957).
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the two methods of rendition separately, the court held that the seizure
and delivery provisions violated the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment in that the citizen's right of free ingress and egress
"would be impaired, if not destroyed," 8 and further, that the Florida courts
were without power to issue process effective beyond state borders under
9
the summons provisions of the statute.
The extraterritorial aspects of these provisions which permit the foreign
state to serve summons on a proposed witness within its jurisdiction, directing him to perform an affirmative act beyond state borders, do not compel
invalidation of the act. The instant court relied on the rule of Pennoyer
v. Neff 10 which holds the acquisition of personal jurisdiction through service
of process outside state borders invalid. The court failed to distinguish this
from requiring the performance of an act outside the state by a person over
whom the court has acquired valid personal jurisdiction within the state
under the Uniform Act. Moreover, the Florida opinion cited by the
court,'1 holding that a warrant issued in the District of Columbia confers
no authority of arrest on a Florida official, is not controlling. This case, like
Pennoyer v. Neff, holds only that a state court may not send process outside
its borders to acquire personal jurisdiction or to compel the performance of
an act pursuant to such process. If personal jurisdiction is acquired within
the state, however, it has been held that such jurisdiction includes the power
2
to compel the performance of an act in another state.' A court of equity
may compel the performance of a contract or order an act in another jurisdiction pursuant to an injunction.'3 In addition, courts frequently require
that persons within their jurisdiction produce documentary evidence found
14
beyond the territorial limits of the court.
8. Instant case at 154.
9. Id. at 155.
10. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).

11. Passett v. Chase, 91 Fla. 522, 107 So. 689 (1926).

12. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952); SEC v. Minas

De Artemisa, 150 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1945); Vinyard Land & Stock Co. v.
Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co., 245 Fed. 9 (9th Cir. 1917); The

Salton Sea Cases, 172 Fed. 792 (9th Cir. 1909) ; Madden v. Rosseter, 114 Misc. 416,
187 N.Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 196 App. Div. 891, 187 N.Y. Supp. 943 (1921).
See also RFSTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAws § 94 (1934): "A state can exercise

jurisdiction through its courts to make a decree directing a party subject to the jurisdiction of the court to do an act in another state, provided such act is not contrary
to the law of the state in which it is to be performed."
13. See, e.g., cases cited note 12 supra. See also RESTATEMENT, CONFLCr OF

LA-ws § 94, illustration 2 (1934).

14. See, e.g., Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908);
Independent Order of Foresters v. Scott, 223 Iowa 105, 272 N.W. 68 (1936) ; Copper
King of Ariz. v. Robert, 76 N.J. Eq. 251, 74 Atl. 292 (Ch. 1909). It may be argued
that the rationale of the equity doctrine is that such an order is pursuant to a deterrnination that the person subject to it has wrongfully done or omitted to do some
act, while rendition involves an act by an innocent person pursuant to a duty.
However, the power of a state to compel acts outside its borders would not seem to
stand or fall on such distinctions. If the act failed to assure the witness immunity
from criminal prosecution, it might be objectionable on the ground that the requesting
state could use the act to send process extraterritorially. For further comment on the
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The absence of provision for bail under the custody and delivery procedure of the act was held to render that section unconstitutional by the
trial judge in the instant case, 15 although the appellate court did not consider
the issue. 16 While most state constitutions secure to the criminal defendant
the right to bail in non-capital cases, 17 this right does not extend to witnesses
whose presence is necessary to a trial. Ordinarily, witnesses are subpoenaed
and failure to obey the subpoena results in attachment for contempt of
court.' 8 In addition, statutes in nearly all jurisdictions confer on the courts
the power to require recognizance of a witness, and to commit to jail a
witness who fails to give such surety.' Bail in this instance is a requirement
to assure the attendance of the witness rather than a constitutional right
as it is for the accused. If bail is to be required under the present Uniform
Act, it should be provided only as a supplement to the subpoena provisions,
thus adding an intermediate procedure whereby an allegedly unwilling
witness would be required to give surety. Upon determination of the degree
of compulsion necessary to secure his attendance, the foreign judge could
then either issue a subpoena, require bail with the subpoena, or seize and
deliver the reluctant witness to the requesting state, depending on the circumstances of the case. Affording an unwilling witness the protection of a
mandatory right to bail under the seizure provisions of the act not only is
unnecessary under existing constitutional doctrines but such a requirement
would negate the very purpose of those provisions. The reluctant witness
is seized and delivered to the requesting state only pursuant to a determination that he could not be relied upon to appear except by such a method.
Impairment of the privilege of free ingress and egress was held by the
instant court to render the Uniform Act unconstitutional.20 This privilege,
while an incident of national citizenship which cannot be impaired by discriminatory state legislation, 2 is not an unlimited right.22 No one would
contest the right of a state to temporarily interfere with the free movement
of any person within its borders, who, coincident with his duty to give
issue of extraterritoriality see Note, 31 MINN. L. Ray. 699, 707 (1947); Note, 85
U. PA. L. Rlv. 717, 722 (1937); 41 MicH. L. Ray. 171 (1942); 8 U. CrI. L. Rv.
567, 568 (1941).
15. Instant case at 152. Writers have also suggested the inclusion of a bail
provision. See Note, 10 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 345, 357 (1942). New York and
Pennsylvania have added a bail provision. N.Y. CODE CRim. PROC. § 618-a; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 622.2 (Supp. 1957).
16. Instant case at 155.
17. 8 Am. JuR. Bail § 13 (1950).
18. 58 Am. Ju. Witnesses § 9 (1948).
19. Id. § 10; 1912D Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 338-40; see, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 651 (1930).
20. Instant case at 154.
21. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177, 181 (1941)

(concurring opinions).

22. See, e.g., id. at 184 (concurring opinion) : "The right of the citizen to migrate
from state to state . . . shown by our precedents to be one of national citizenship,
is not, however, an unlimited one. In addition to being subject to all constitutional
limitations imposed by the federal government, such citizen is subject to some control

1958]
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testimony in a criminal court, was summoned to testify in that state's courts.
Aside from the added inconvenience of travel to the requesting state, the
Uniform Act goes no further in suspending this right.2
The proper inquiry, not touched upon by the instant court, would seem
to be whether the act deprives witnesses of liberty without due process.
Such an inquiry involves a balancing of the necessity for rendition against
the hardship imposed on the individual witness. Necessity, in some cases
at least, is clear. The act is aimed at surmounting the problem faced by the
trial court when a material witness to a criminal prosecution or a grand
jury hearilg is not within reach of the court's process. Two alternatives
are available-rendition and deposition. While use of depositions in case
of unavailability of a witness is not a violation of defendant's constitutional
24
right to confrontation provided adequate cross-examination is afforded,
this method fails to present the demeanor of the testifying witness to the
judge and jury.m In addition, many states strictly limit the taking and use
of depositions in criminal proceedings to specified situations of unavailability
such as physical infirmity or extreme personal hardship.28 Thus rendition
is frequently the only means of securing the needed testimony. In such
cases, the imposition of at least minor inconvenience on the witness seems
justified. Both necessity and hardship vary from case to case, however.
In some situations the hardship may be so severe, or the need for the witness'
appearance in court so slight, that rendition would be unreasonable. A
procedure must therefore be provided for limiting the operation of the act
to those cases in which, balancing hardship against necessity, the deprivation of the witness' liberty would be reasonable. Such means are provided
by the hearing before the foreign judge.27 At this hearing the judge must
weigh the necessity of attendance as evidenced by the certificate issued in the
forum state against the hardship in rendering the particular witness before
him. The determination of necessity would seem to require consideration
of three factors: the importance of the testimony sought, the nature of the
proceeding--capital or non-capital criminal case, or grand jury hearingand the availability of depositions as a reasonable alternative to rendition.
When these variables are balanced against such elements of hardship as time
required, distance to travel, and personal inconvenience and financial loss
to the individual, the judge will determine whether or not the witness
by state governments. He may not, if a fugitive from justice, claim freedom to
migrate unmolested, nor may he endanger others by carrying contagion about. These
causes, and perhaps others that do not occur to me now, warrant any public authority
in stopping a man where it finds him and arresting his progress across a state line
quite as much as from place to place within the state."
23. For further treatment of this issue see Note, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 717, 721
(1937); 8 U. CHr. L. REv. 567, 570 (1941).
24. 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1397 n.1, 1398 (3d ed. 1940).
25. Id. § 1399.
26. Id. §§ 1403-11.
27. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 942.02 (1944) ; 9 U.L.A. 92-93 (1957).

280

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107

should be subject to rendition at all. If it is deemed necessary to render
the witness to the forum state and that state has requested that the witness
be seized and delivered, the foreign judge must further determine whether
seizure is reasonable in light of the likelihood that the witness would fail to
obey the subpoena.2 8
It would seem therefore that the principal danger in the act arises from
the application of its procedure to cases involving undue hardship to the
witness. Advertence to this danger and avoidance of an unreasonable operation of the statute is the primary duty of the judge conducting the hearing.
Absent abuse of discretion on the part of either the requesting or the foreign
judge, the Uniform Act would seem to be a reasonable and constitutional
means of securing material evidence.

DEFAMATION BY RADIO-RADio STATION HELD NOT LIABL,
FoR DEFAMATORY REMARKS BROADCAST BY POLITICAL CANDIDATE
WDAY, defendant radio station, had granted broadcasting time to
two of three candidates for United States Senator from North Dakota.
Thereafter, the third candidate requested equal opportunity to use defendant's facilities and submitted a proposed script for this purpose. WDAY
notified the candidate that it believed certain statements in the script to be
defamatory and refused to allow broadcast of this material unless a demand
for time was made under section 315 of the Federal Communications Act.'
When the candidate made such a demand, a broadcast of the proposed script
was permitted. In the course of the broadcast, plaintiff was allegedly defamed by being referred to as a communist organization, and suit was
brought against both the candidate and WDAY. The trial court dismissed
the action as to WDAY and the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed.
The court held that Congress had pre-empted the field of interstate radio
and television communication, and, since section 315 prohibits stations
from censoring the speeches of political candidates and in view of the reasonable conduct of the station, the court granted WDAY an immunity
Farmers Educ. & Co-op.
from liability for the instant defamation.
Union v. WDAY, Inc., 89 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. 1958), cert. granted, 79
Sup. Ct. 56 (1958) (No. 699).2
28. Ibid.
1. 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1952).
2. See also the recent decision of Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928 (D. Tenn.
1958), which quoted approvingly from the instant case. There the alleged defamation occurred while a candidate conducted a twenty-six and one-half hour "talkathon" over the facilities of defendant stations. This purchased time was in excess
of that requested or used by the opposing candidate. Verdicts were returned in
favor of plaintiff against the candidate and the radio stations. The radio stations
renewed their motions for directed verdicts, made at the close of the evidence, arguing
that § 315 gives the station a "privilege or immunity from suit for defamation . . .
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Candidates for public office, in actions for defamation, have long had
the qualified defense that they were commenting on matters of public
interest. The majority rule limits this privilege to statements of opinion and
"fair" comment while a considerable minority extend it to false statements
of fact honestly made.3 If a speaker over the radio is privileged, the radio
station generally enjoys at least the same privilege.4 Where the speaker
has no privilege to make the remarks, as in the instant case, the law is
unsettled as to the liability 8 of the station.0 Some courts have imposed
strict liability on the station as a primary publisher, reasoning by analogy
to the liability of a newspaper.7 Others view the station as a disseminator,
liable only in the absence of due care. 8 The latter courts reject the newspaper analogy as inapplicable, reasoning that newspapers exert a greater
amount of control over publication than do radio stations. 9 The question
posed by the instant case-the narrower problem of radio station liability
for the defamation of political candidates-arises as a result of section 315
of the Communications Act. That section provides that:
broadcast by a . . . candidate . . . who was granted time after his opponent had

been granted time." The court was of the opinion "that from . . . Section 315
• . . there results by necessary implication an immunity of a broadcaster from
liability for defamatory material broadcast by a legally qualified candidate."
The court rejected plaintiff's contention that § 315 is applicable only when candidates seek "equal opportunities," holding that: "The purpose of the statute would
be seriously curtailed and frustrated if its application depended upon an exact division
of time between the respective candidates in a political race." Plaintiff further argued
that since §315 prohibited censorship over broadcasts made "under this section,"
a station is not entitled to immunity unless it was compelled to enter into the broadcast agreement as a result of § 315. Plaintiff asserted that time was granted the
speaker not because of § 315 but for selfish motives of the station. The court characterized the argument as proceeding upon the false premise that § 315 applies only
when it is specifically invoked. The court said it is clear "that Section 315 occupies
the field of political broadcasts made by candidates for public office and that it was
intended to apply and govern notwithstanding the wishes of the parties affected."
3. PROSsER, ToRTs 621 (2d ed. 1955) and cases cited therein.
4. Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938).
5. Liability is used herein in the sense of the responsibility of the radio station
for the remarks of one other than an employee, agent or operator.
6. For a comprehensive review of defamation by radio see Remmers, Recent
Legislative Trends it Defamation by Radio, 64 HARv.L. REv. 727 (1951).
7. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934);
Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932); Miles v. Louis Wasmer,
Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933).
8. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302
(1939); Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d
985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
9. In Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., mtpra note 8, the station
was held not liable for an extemporaneous defamatory remark where it exercised
due care in the selection of the lessee and inspection and editing of the script. The
court reasoned that strict liability is unnecessary in this field as radio is closely
regulated by government and that such liability would invite fraud and perjury.
The court made reference to possible conspiracies to defame, participated in by the
speaker and the alleged victim, and also the ease with which the spoken word is
distorted and made to appear much worse than actually spoken. That court also
rejected the argument that absolute liability should be imposed because the radio
station could protect itself therefrom by an indemnifying bond.
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"(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified
candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall
afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office
in the use of such broadcasting station; Provided, That such licensee
shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the
provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon any licensee
to allow the use of its station by any such candidate..

" 10

Sorenson v. Wood," the first judicial interpretation of this section, rejected
the contention that a radio station was granted a privilege to broadcast

defamatory statements by this provision since the section "merely prevents
the licensee from censoring the words as to their political and partisan trend
but does not give a licensee any privilege to join and assist in the publication
of a libel nor grant any immunity from the consequences of such action." 12
Accordingly the court imposed strict liability.13 In the now famous case
of Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 14 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was faced with an attempt to block the renewal of a radio station's license because it had allegedly violated the censorship prohibition of
section 315. The Commission took the position that the prohibition of
censorship in section 315 is absolute, and that no exception exists for defamatory material. 15 As to the argument that this would leave the station
unable to delete defamatory material and yet remain liable for such remarks
the Commission said:
"As we read the provision of section 315, the prohibition contained
therein against censorship in connection with political broadcasts appears dearly to constitute an occupation of the field by Federal author10. Section 315, 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1952).
The balance of this section appears as follcws: "(b) The charges made for the
use of any broadcasting station for any purposes set forth in this section shall not
exceed the charges made for comparable use of such station for other purposes.
(c) The Commission shall prescribe appropriate rules and regulations to carry out
the provisions of this section." The Federal Communications Commission has never
acted under § 315(c) with regard to censorship.
11. 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932). This case is distinguishable because,
while the court's opinion is couched in broad terms, the defamatory speech was
not made by a "legally qualified candidate," but by a third party in his behalf. The
case of Felix v. Westinghouse, 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denled, 341 U.S. 909
(1951), holds that § 315 is strictly confined to the use of broadcasting facilities by
candidates themselves and not to their supporters.
12. 123 Neb. at 354, 243 N.W. at 85.
13. See also Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo.
1934), which, although not involving § 315, is analogous in that the defendant radio
station broadcasted directly a defamatory network program in Kansas which originated in New York City, being unaware of any possible defamation and unable to
prevent its utterance once begun. The court assumed no fault by the defendant but
found absolute liability, accepting the newspaper analogy and citing Sorenson.
14. 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).
15. The action of the station in Port Huron--granting time for political speeches,
reading the first script and then cancelling all the speeches-was held to constitute
censorship; however, the station's license was renewed.
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ity, which, under the law, would relieve the licensee of responsibility
for any libelous matter broadcast in the course of a speech coming
within section 315 irrespective of the provisions of State law." 16
The authorities being in conflict, the solution of the problem must necessarily
involve a determination of the intended scope of the Communications Act
and particularly the meaning of section 315.
An examination of the Communications Act 17 reveals a detailed, comprehensive regulation of interstate communications.' 8 Although there is
no prior case squarely holding a radio station's liability for defamation to be
an exclusive federal question, the First Circuit took this view as to telegraph
companies, 19 which are regulated by the same act. Similarly, it has been
held that the states are no longer free to regulate radio stations,20 as such,
or to censor any material broadcast. 2 ' However, the Communications Act
notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has held that state courts may adjudicate rights arising under radio station contracts 2 and transfer of property.2- This application of state law apparently is valid even though the
result of the state decision is to destroy the capabilities of the station to
broadcast under an otherwise valid license. 24 Moreover, state courts have
continued to adjudicate general defamation actions against radio stations.2
16. 12 F.C.C. at 1074. For the subsequent history of Port Huron see Houston
Post Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Tex. 1948), which held that the
opinion of the Commission was not an "order" subject to judicial review but merely
an opinion as to the meaning of § 315.
17. 48 Stat 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
18. The act contains provisions relating to telephones, telegraphs, radios, radio
equipment and radio operators on board ship. It devotes a chapter to procedure and
administration of the act, provides penal provisions and creates the FCC with broad
regulatory powers.
19. O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940). The court
said at 541: "Congress having occupied the field by enacting a fairly comprehensive
scheme of regulation it seems clear that questions relating to the duties, privileges
and liabilities of telegraph companies in the transmission of interstate messages must
be governed by uniform federal rules." The analogy of this case to the instant
problem is weakened by the O'Brien court's reference, in determining liability, to the
common carrier character of a telegraph company. The argument that the radio
station be considered a common carrier with respect to political broadcasts is refuted
by the act itself, by § 153(h) (48 Stat. 1065 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 153(h)
(1952)) in particular, and by debate in the Senate, 67 CONG. REc. 12501-05 (1926).
Moreover, the O'Brien court relied heavily upon the need of telegraph companies to
transmit rapidly without taking time to study each message for possible defamatory
matter.
20. National Broadcasting Co. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 25 F. Supp. 761
(D.N.J. 1938).
21. Allen B. Dumont Labs., Inc. v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951).
22. Regents v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 586 (1950).
23. WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945).
24. Id. at 131-32.
25. See Hartman v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947); Locke v.
Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Sorenson v. Wood,
123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932). See also § 414 of the Communications Act which
provides that remedies existing at common law or by statute shall not be abridged
or altered. 48 Stat. 1099 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1952).
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Therefore, holdings that a state may not regulate the radio industry are not
determinative of the question whether Congress intended that a state created
right of an action for defamation by a private party was to be destroyed
because the defamation was broadcast in a political speech. Congressional
intent in this area is, at best, unclear.2 6 On the one hand, the Radio Act
of 1927, as originally drafted,27 contained an exemption from liability. However, when reported out of conference 28 this provision was deleted with no
accompanying explanation. Subsequent efforts to amend section 315 to give
the broadcaster an immunity have failed of passage over the years.29 On
the other hand the furor created by the Port Huron opinion resulted in
congressional hearings by a house committee. 30 Again no action was taken
by Congress. The FCC has taken the position that this latter inactivity
is indicative of congressional approval of its opinion in that case and that in
the future, therefore, it will strictly enforce the no-censorship provision of
section 315 and not "accept the argument that state statutes or common law
on the subject of libel in some way supplant or modify the unqualified
pronouncement of Congress on the use of the interstate facilities of radio
by candidates in making political broadcasts." 31 Thus it would appear
that there is no conclusive evidence that Congress has intended to foreclose
state determination of the liability of a radio station for defamation broadcast
by a political candidate.
This is not to say, however, that state courts are free even under
existing authorities to create whatever rules they wish with regard to this
liability. The Supreme Court has stated that "the prohibition of a federal
statute may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied, by state statutes
or state common law rules. .

.

. To the federal statute and policy con-

flicting state law and policy must yield." 32 Here then the state defamation
law must yield, if necessary, to the policies of the Federal Communications
Act. It is clear, even aside from the proscription of section 315, that if the
26. The instant court made no reference to legislative history but said, "We cannot
believe that it was the intent of Congress to compel a station to broadcast libelous
statements and at the same time subject it to the risk of defending actions for damages." Instant case at 109.
27. 44 Stat. 1170 (1927) (now Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1064
(1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1952)).
28. H.R. REP. No. 1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1927).
29. See H.R. 7716, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1932) (pocket veto); H.R. 9229, H.R.
9230, H.R. 9231, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (died in committee) ; H.R. 2981, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) (died in committee) ; S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947),
and Hearings on S. 1333 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (no action) ; S. 1208, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) and H.R. 4814, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) (died in committee). Cf. also S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), which gave the station power
to censor defamatory material; the bill died in committee.
30. Hearings on H.R. Res. 691 Before House Committee on Rules, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1948); First Interim Report, H.R. Rep. No. 2461, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1948).

31. WDSU Broadcasting Co., 7 P & F RADIo REP. 769 (1951).
32. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
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intent of Congress is to be effected,as no censorship of candidates by the
station, with the possible exception of obscenity, 3 4 should be permitted.
Censorship could well result in deletion of partisan material with a corresponding loss of information to the electorate. If state courts are permitted to hold the station strictly liable or liable under the usual rules of
defamation, stations might tend to pressure candidates into deleting doubtful material in an effort to avoid liability. Further, such liability might
force the station to grant only minimum time, to meet the public interest
requirement of the act,3 5 for political candidates' speeches, to say nothing
of the undue burden such a rule would place upon the radio industry. Thus,
some limitation of the station's liability is indicated.
It is submitted that granting stations an absolute immunity from liability is not the best possible alternative 3 6 Such immunity would not
encourage radio stations to do their best to avoid publication of defamatory
material. It would condone a station's publishing, for selfish motives, material it, but not the candidate, knew to be defamatory. A duty should be
imposed upon the station which would curtail the publication of defamation
and yet not act as a nullification of section 315. In the absence of federal
legislation, this could be accomplished by reading into section 315 a requirement that the station be relieved of liability under state defamation
laws if it has taken reasonable steps to avoid publication of the defamatory
matter. For example, the station should request, as did the instant defendant, to examine, prior to broadcast, a written script of the speech and call
to the attention of the candidate any doubtful material. As its opinion is
couched in terms of the reasonableness of WDAY's actions, the instant
court appears to have taken this view. Certainly some few candidates will
insist on publication, with resulting defamation of innocent parties. However, in the final analysis, this is preferable either to allowing the station to
censor or to imposing upon it strict liability for defamation.3 7 It is sug33. See the debate in the Senate on H.R. 9971 (Radio Act of 1927), 67 CoNG.
REc. 12501-05 (1926).
34. The Port Huron case stated at 1074 that "Nothing in this opinion is intended
to indicate that a licensee is necessarily without power to prevent the broadcast of
statements or utterances in violation of the provision of the Communications Act or
any other federal law on broadcasts coming within the requirements of Section 315
of the Communications Act." The Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1952), makes it
an offense to "utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language" by radio. Thus it
would seem that the radio station could refuse to publish obscenity and not violate
§ 315.
35. See note 34 supra.
36. An apparent alternative solution to this problem is suggested by §315(a)
itself which states that no obligation is imposed upon the station to allow the use of
its facilities by any candidate. The FCC, however, has indicated that a station
which completely suppresses all political broadcasting would not be fulfilling the public
interest requirement of the Communications Act and that such action would be considered when the Commission reviews applications for license renewal every three
years. Editorializing by Broadcasting Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1948) ; Homer P.
Rainey, 11 F.C.C. 898 (1947).
37. It is recognized that this rule has the effect of rendering immune from liability for damages the generally more solvent party. However, this does not leave the
injured party entirely bereft of a remedy as the speaker of course remains liable.
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gested that this rule, requiring that the broadcaster do all that is reasonable
under section 315 to prevent defamation, will result in voluntary deletion
by the average candidate of obviously defamatory statements and therefore
afford the greatest protection to the public in curtailing defamation without
encroaching upon the congressional policy of guaranteeing unbiased presentation of the views of candidates for public office.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW-STATE DE IAL OF REQUEST To
CONFER WITH CouNsEL D- InG
To VIOLATE DUE PROCESS

POLICE INTERROGATION HELD NOT

Petitioner, a college graduate who had completed the first year of law
school, was arrested by Los Angeles police and questioned concerning the
murder of his paramour. During the interrogation, petitioner repeatedly
asked to consult with counsel, naming a specific attorney who he thought
might represent him, but was told that he could call an attorney when the
investigation was concluded. After fourteen hours of intermittent questioning, petitioner wrote and signed a confession to the murder, which was
subsequently admitted as evidence at his trial. Petitioner was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death, the Supreme Court of California affirming.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state denial of a
suspect's request, made during police questioning, for an opportunity to
consult counsel did not in itself violate due process. Crooker v. California,

357 U.S. 433 (1958).1
Although the sixth amendment does not in terms apply to the states,
due process, under some circumstances, may require that the states provide
the criminal defendant with legal counsel.2 Moreover, it has never been
questioned that the due process clause confers upon the defendant an
absolute right to be represented by counsel which he himself retains.8
Securing a judgment against the speaker, even though uncollectible, is in many cases
adequate compensation to plaintiff as it operates as public vindication of his reputation.
It is felt that this factor plus the policy considerations set forth in text outweigh the
possible loss to the plaintiff. See Mopms, ToRTs 284-309, especially 285-86.
1. A companion case, Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958), involved police
denial, during petitioner's interrogation, of repeated requests of petitioner and his
attorney to be allowed to confer. A confession of a murder was obtained from defendant before he was allowed access to his counsel. Following a plea of noim vult
in a New Jersey court and a subsequent sentence to life imprisonment, the federal
district court discharged petitioner's writ of habeas corpus. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed on the authority of the instant case.
2. On the due process right to counsel in state courts, see generally BEANEY,
THE RIGHT To CouNsEL. IN AMERICAN CouRTs 142-98 (1955); Fellman, The Federal
Right to Counsel in State Courts, 31 NEB. L. Rxv. 15 (1951).
3. The United States Supreme Court noted in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
59 (1932), that "if in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbi-

1958]

RECENT CASES

However, the point in the state criminal proceedings at which the constitutional right to retained counsel accrues has not been settled. The
United States Supreme Court has frequently stated, in general terms, that
the constitutional right to counsel guaranteed by the due process clause is
not confined to the trial on the merits,4 and has recognized that the right to
retained counsel may be more extensive than the right to the assistance
of appointed counsel.8 In general, however, whether the case before it
involved denial of retained counsel or refusal of the state to appoint counsel,
the Court has attempted to weigh degrees of prejudicial error in a case-bycase approach, scrupulously avoiding a position that denial of counsel is in
itself an infringement of due process. 6 In the absence of a definitive Supreme Court position on the question, state and lower federal courts have
tended to hold that the accused has no right to retained counsel, and a
fortiori no right to appointed counsel, during pre-trial proceedings that do
not adjudicate guilt or innocence. Thus, it has been held that there is no
8
such right during a preliminary hearing,7 a coroner's inquest, a grand

jury proceeding,9 or a police interrogation.1
The function of legal counsel in a criminal trial-guiding the defendant

through the intricacies of substantive law and procedure-is essentially
trarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it
reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing,
and therefore, of due process in the Constitutional sense."
4. E.g., Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160 (1957); Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
5. Thus, in House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945), the Court said, "This was
a denial of petitioner's constitutional right to a fair trial, with the aid and assistance
of counsel whom he had retained. . . . We need not consider whether the state
would have been required to appoint counsel for petitioner on the facts alleged in the
petition. . . . It is enough that petitioner had his own attorney and was not afforded
a reasonable opportunity to consult with him." The recent case of In re Groban,
352 U.S. 330 (1957), held, in a 5-4 decision, that appellants had no constitutional right
to be assisted by their counsel in giving testimony at a state fire marshal's investigation into the cause of a fire. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, however, carefully
limited their concurrence to situations not involving interrogation or examination of
persons suspected of crime, implying that they would regard as unconstitutional a
statute authorizing exclusion of counsel from such proceedings. In a subsequent case,
the United States Court of Military Appeals relied on the implication raised by the
reservations of the concurring opinion in the Groban case, and cited Groban as authority for a holding that the requirements of due process were violated when a staff
judge advocate told a suspect that he could not consult with counsel in connection
with an interrogation by law enforcement agents. Conviction on a charge of making
a false official statement, growing out of allegedly false statements made to investigators during the interrogation, was reversed. United States v. Gunnels, 8 U.S.C.M.A.
Cf. United States v. Boone, 24 C.M.R. 400 (1958);
130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957).
United States v. Rose, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 441, 24 C.M.R. 251 (1957).
6. See BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 191-98.
7. Lyons v. State, 770 Oka. Crim. 197, 138 P.2d 142 (1943), aff'd, 332 U.S. 596
(1944) ; cf. State v. Braasch, 229 P.2d 289 (Utah 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 910
(1952).
8. People v. Coker, 104 Cal. App.2d 224, 231 P.2d 81 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
9. People v. Dale, 79 Cal. App.2d 370, 179 P.2d 870 (Dist. Ct. App.1947).
10. State v. Rogers, 143 Conn. 167, 120 A.2d 409 (1956) ; People v. Kelly, 404
Ill. 281, 89 N.E2d 27 (1949) ; Raymond v. State ex rel. Szydlouski, 192 Md. 602, 65
A.2d 285 (1949); State v. Murphy, 87 N.J.L. 515, 94 Atl. 640 (Ct. Err. & App.
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quite different from the function of counsel at the interrogation stage. The
need and opportunity for legal advice at this stage would appear to be
limited. The real problem in this situation is the need for protection against
police third degree methods, culminating in a coerced confession. The
value of having counsel present during the police interrogation lies not in
his being trained in the law, but in the protection against coercion afforded
by his mere presence. This problem has been dealt with in federal proceedings by a rule, first announced in the McNabb" case, that any confession
obtained from one illegally detained due to police failure to bring the suspect
promptly before a commissioner is inadmissible. The McNabb rule is not,
however, regarded as a limitation imposed by the requirements of due
process. The Supreme Court regards it rather as an evidentiary rule, and
requires compliance with it in federal courts by virtue of the Court's power
of supervision over the procedures and practices of federal courts. In cases
arising in the state courts under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court has held that the standard to be used in determining
admissibility of a confession is whether or not it was given voluntarily, and
the fact that the confession was made during a period when the preliminary
hearing was illegally delayed is but one element to be considered in this
regard.' 2 A formidable problem faces the defendant in a state criminal
proceeding who seeks to establish, on appeal, that his confession was coerced.
Although the appellate court is required to make an independent determination of the coercion issue from the undisputed facts,18 it must accept the
resolution of disputed facts made by the triers of fact below. 14 Vigorous
and self-righteous police denial of coercive activities will ordinarily suffice
to take specific allegations of coercion out of the realm of undisputed facts,
precluding their consideration upon review. The likelihood of coercion in
extended police interrogation, coupled with the difficulty of establishing it at
the trial and upon review, would seem to call for safeguards against coercion
more effective and more extensive than past decisions have required of state
1915).

Contra, Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 88 N.E.2d 386 (1949) ; Benton v. State,

86 Okla. Crim. 137, 190 P.2d 168 (1948). Nor is there any generally recognized
duty on the part of an arresting officer to inform the person arrested of his right to

counsel. Leick v. People, 322 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1958) ; Commonwealth v. Bryant, 367
Pa. 135, 79 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1951).
11. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).

12. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).

"The rule of the McNabb case

is not a limitation imposed by the Due Process Clause . . . Compliance with
the McNabb rule is required in federal courts by this Court through its power of
supervision over the procedure and practices of federal courts in the trial of criminal

cases. That power over state criminal trials is not vested in this Court." Id. at 63-64.
13. "Where the claim is that the prisoner's statement has been procured by
[coercion], we are bound to make an independent examination of the record to determine the validity of the claim. The performance of this duty cannot be foreclosed by
the finding of a court, or the verdict of a jury, or both." Lisenba v. California, 314

U.S. 219, 237-38 (1941).

14. "Enforcement of the criminal laws of the States rests principally with the
state courts, and generally their findings of fact, fairly made upon substantial and
conflicting testimony as to the circumstances producing the contested confession . . .

are not this Court's concern...."

Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 562 (1958).
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authorities. It is questionable, however, whether an absolute constitutional
right to retained counsel from the moment of arrest, advocated by the dissent in the instant case, 15 would be a workable solution to this long-standing
problem. Protection against third degree practices is needed as much by
the suspect who is ignorant of his "right to counsel" as by one who demands
to see his lawyer upon arrest. Indeed, it is arguable that the suspect who
demands counsel is more likely to be an experienced criminal, less likely
to confess under coercion than the suspect who does not. Moreover, protection against coercive practices should not depend upon the ability of the
accused to pay for the services of counsel. If protection against coercive
questioning is to take the form of access to counsel, ordinary fairness would
seem to require the presence of counsel for all suspects, assigned if necessary,
at every police interrogation whether requested or not. The difficulty and
expense of providing local arrangements adequate to insure universal access
to counsel upon arrest argue strongly against extension of the right to
counsel as a solution to the problem of coercive interrogation. From the
standpoint of feasibility, a conversion of the McNabb rule from an evidentiary rule applicable only in the federal courts to a test of due process
applicable in state and federal cases alike would appear preferable. A rule
that due process requires the exclusion of confessions obtained during a
period of illegal detention would relieve the suspect of the highly burdensome necessity of establishing specific prejudice as to such confessions at the
trial and upon appeal. The effect upon the police would not seem to be
unduly hampering when balanced against the desirable protection to civil
rights which would ensue from such a rule. The efficiency of federal law
enforcement does not appear to have suffered notably during the fifteen
years since the McNabb rule was announced. Indeed, a McNabb type rule
in state criminal prosecutions should promote police efficiency by encouraging careful investigative procedures in lieu of wholesale arrest and interrogation of suspects.' 6
It is not surprising that the Court declined to rule that petitioner had
a right to counsel during preliminary interrogation. Since the need of an
accused at this point of the proceedings is for protection from overzealous
police methods rather than for competent legal advice, the question before
the Court was much the same as in Gallegos v. Nebraska,'7 in which it de15. "The demands of our civilization expressed in the Due Process Clause require
that the accused who wants a counsel should have one at any time after the moment
of arrest." Instant case at 448.
16. "One argument [against the third degree] is that it tends to render the police
less efficient as an over-all matter, because it is a reliance on easy and crude methods
of work instead of on time-consuming efficient methods. . . . So a very real cost
item is the promotion of inefficient methods of action at the sacrifice of modern and
efficient methods. Akin and very closely allied to this is the argument that it
brutalizes the police force and makes it into the merely repressive agency that too

many people in any event believe it to be."
CmrNAr LAw 74 (1953).
17. 342 U.S. 55 (1951).

Punr,_mm,
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termined not to apply a McNabb type rule to the states on the ground that
the federal government should not interfere with local law enforcement to
this extent.' 8 The holding of the instant Court is in line with its established
practice of treating no one invasion of the accused's rights as sufficient in
all cases to brand a state practice as violative of due process. Rather, the
facts of each case are considered in making this determination.

INCOME TAX-STATE LAW HELD To DETERminE LIABrILIY OF
BENEFIoIRY FOR TAX DEFicIENciEs OF INSURED
Taxpayer died in 1949 leaving his widow as beneficiary of several life
insurance policies. During his life, taxpayer had reserved the right to
change beneficiaries and withdraw the cash surrender value of each policy.
Nearly six years after his death, the Tax Court held that taxpayer had been
deficient in his income taxes for the years 1944 through 1947. There was
no evidence that he was insolvent prior to his death or that he paid any
insurance premiums in fraud of creditors. Because of insufficient assets in
his estate to meet this tax liability, the Commissioner proceeded against his
widow, as transferee of the insurance proceeds, under the collection procedure set forth in section 311 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.1 The
Tax Court held that, as beneficiary of her husband's life insurance, taxpayer's widow was liable as a transferee of the proceeds for the full amount
of the deficiencies. 2 The court of appeals reversed,8 holding that the widow
was not a transferee under section 311 4 and, alternatively, that applicable
state law 5 exempted the beneficiary from liability where the premiums were
not paid in fraud of creditors. The Supreme Court expressly left the transferee question open, and affirmed on the ground that state law governs and
18. See note 12 srupra.
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6901, does not materially change Int. Rev. Code
90. Section 311 provides:

of 1939, ch. 1, § 311, 53 Stat.

"(a) Method of Collection. The amounts of the following liabilities shall . . .
be assessed, collected and paid in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of a deficiency in a tax imposed by this
chapter . . .:
"(1) Transferees. The liability, at law or in equity, of a transferee of property
of a taxpayer, in respect of the tax . . . imposed upon the taxpayer by this
chapter.
"(f) Definition of 'transferee'. As used in this section, the term 'transferee'
includes heir, legatee, devisee, and distributee."
2.Instant case at 40.
3. Stern v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1957); 5 UTAH L. REV. 556
(1957).
4. The court of appeals relied on Tyson v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 16 (6th Cir.
1954).
5. Ky. REv. STAT. §§297.140, 297.150 (1948).
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relieves the beneficiary of liability in this case.

357 U.S. 39 (1958).

Commissioner v. Stern,

6

The purpose of section 311 is to create a procedure by which the Gov7
ernment may collect taxes from the transferee of a delinquent taxpayer.
However, prior to the Stern decision there was considerable conflict in the
application of section 311 not only between the tax courts and the courts
of appeals, but among the courts of appeals themselves. This conflict encompassed two questions-whether a beneficiary of a life insurance policy
was a transferee within the meaning of section 311, and, if so, whether state
law or federal decisional law governed transferee liability., In answer to
the first question the tax courts had consistently held that not only was a
beneficiary liable as a transferee, but that the liability extended to the entire
proceeds where distribution of the insurance rendered the estate insolvent. 9
This position was supported by an analogy to estate tax provisions. 10 The
majority of the circuit courts that have passed on this question also have
held that the beneficiary is a transferee under section 311, but only to the
extent of the cash surrender value of the policy at the insured's death."
To determine what property has been transferred, the test applied by these
courts is whether the assets in question could have been distrained for
6. In a companion case, United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958), the Court held
that where the Government had attached a tax lien under Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
ch. 36, § 3670, 53 Stat. 448, against a delinquent taxpayer during his lifetime, his widow
was liable for the cash surrender value of his life insurance policies. Section 3670
(INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321) provides: "If any person liable to pay any tax
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in
favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property whether real or
personal, belonging to such person." Whether or not the insured has any property
rights under § 3670 is to be determined by state law. "However, once it has been determined that state law creates sufficient interests in the insured to satisfy the requirements of Section 3670, state law is inoperative to prevent the attachment of liens
created by federal statutes in favor of the United States." United States v. Bess, supra
at 56. Thus, where a tax lien attached prior to the insured's death the decision of the
instant case is inapplicable. See also United States v. Hoper, 242 F.2d 468 (7th Cir.
1957) ; United States v. Behrens, 230 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1956). Perhaps one of the reasons for giving the Government a preferred position in Bess is to encourage the perfection of tax liens during the insured's lifetime.
7. Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U.S. 233 (1937); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
8. See generally Note, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 693 (1957).
9. Mary Stounen, 27 T.C. 1014 (1957) ; Aura Grimes Bales, 22 T.C. 355 (1954);
Sadie D. Leary, 18 T.C. 139 (1952) ; Christine D. Muller, 10 T.C. 678 (1948) ; 1958
INs. L.J. 94; 13 TAx L. REv. 313 (1958).
10. The section of the estate tax provisions referred to by the Tax Court is
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 900(e), 53 Stat. 138, which states that a "transferee"
was to include any person who under § 827(b) is personally liable. Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, ch. 3, § 827(b), 53 Stat 128, specifically included beneficiaries, and imposed
liability on any person who receives property included within the gross estate of the
decedent. Since insurance proceeds are includable in the gross estate by Int Rev.
Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811, 53 Stat. 120, beneficiaries are subject to transferee liability.
The Tax Court argued that since insurance proceeds are considered property of the
decedent for transferee liability purposes, there is no reason why proceeds should not
be property for income tax purposes, thereby imposing beneficiary liability under
§ 311 not only by analogy to § 900(e) but also through the fact that proceeds are
properly includable in the decedent's estate.
11. United States v. Bess, 243 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 1 (1958);
United States v. New, 217 F2d 166 (7th Cir. 1954); Rowen v. Commissioner, 215
F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Commissioner v. Western Union, 141 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
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delinquent taxes in the hands of the insured as property of a taxpayer. 12
Since the cash surrender value, but not the entire proceeds, could be so
and in Tyson v. Commissioner,'3 held that the beneficiary was not a transdistrained, these courts have reasoned that the beneficiary's liability is
limited to the cash surrender value. The Sixth Circuit, in the instant case
feree at all, reasoning that the cash surrender value was not part of the
proceeds of the insurance policy and therefore the beneficiary did not receive
it as a transferee of the estate of the insured. As to the question of whether
state law or federal decisional law determines transferee liability, the Tax
Court,' 4 the Third Circuit,' 5 and the Ninth Circuit "0 have applied federal
decisional law. The majority of the circuit courts, however, have applied
state law.' 7 The latter courts have reasoned that neither section 311 nor
any other federal statute defines transferee liability, and, since Congress
could have pre-empted the field and did not, it "must have intended that
the existence of the liability should be determined by state law." 18
The Supreme Court in the instant case based its decision to apply state
law on several grounds. First, the Court found support for its position in
the legislative history of section 280 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1926,
the predecessor of section 311. In considering that section the Senate committee stated that it neither defined nor changed existing liability.' 9 Existing liability was identified as liability ensuing "by reason of the trust fund
12. See note 11 supra.
13. 212 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1954).
14. See note 9 supra. Following the instant decision, the Tax Court in two
cases held a beneficiary not liable as a transferee under applicable state law. Helen
E. Myers, 30 T.C., No. 68 (June 25, 1958); and Becky Osborne Hampton, 30 T.C.,

No. 67 (June 25, 1958).
15. United States v. Bess, 243 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 1 (1958);
Pearlman v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1946), criticized in 94 U. PA. L.
REv. 434 (1946). Although the court in both cases applied federal decisional law, the
cases can be distinguished from the instant case on their facts. In Bess, the Government had perfected a tax lien against the insured during his lifetime. In Pearlnmn,
taxpayer continued paying premiums on the policies even after he was insolvent.
16. Kieferdorf v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1944). This case can
also be distinguished from the instant case since the beneficiary of the taxpayer's
policies was the taxpayer's estate.

17. United States v. Truax, 223 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. New,
217 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Rowen v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1954) ;

Commissioner v. Western Union, 141 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); Stern v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1957) (alternative holding). Most writers also agree
with this position. See 9 MERTENS, LAW Op FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 53.41
(1958); PAUL, SELECTE STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAxATooN 11, 15 (1938); Morold,
Transferee Liability, in N.Y.U. 13TH INST. oN FED. TAX. 1073 (1955); 55 CoLum.

L. REv. 98 (1955); 103 U. PA.L. REv. 451 (1955).

With regard to transferees who are not beneficiaries there is also a conflict, the
majority of courts holding that state law applies. See Botz v. Helvering, 134 F.2d
538 (8th Cir. 1943) ; United States v. Goldblatt Bros., 128 F2d 576 (7th Cir. 1942) ;
Weil v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1937). Contra, Commissioner v. Keller,
59 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1932). See generally Norman, State Legislation and Federal
Taxatim, 26 TAxEs 35, 40 (1948).
18. Rowen v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 641, 647 (2d Cir. 1954).
19. S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-30 (1926).
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doctrine and various State statutory provisions...
"220 However, the
House committee indicated that the newly created Board of Tax Appeals
would "develop a uniformity of precedents in lieu of the present rather
vague principles of law governing the liability of a transferee for unpaid
taxes of a transferor." 21 The problem in using this legislative history is
twofold. First, there is conflict within the Senate committee report itself,
for the trust fund doctrine was determined by federal decisional law. Thus
the report states that liability was to continue to be determined by both
federal decisional law and state law. Second, at the time these reports
were issued there was a federal common law under the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson.22 With the change in circumstances since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,2
it would not seem appropriate to look to congressional intent to determine
this question. A second ground for the Court's decision was that the effort
involved in the creation of federal decisional law in this area "is plainly
not justified when there exists a flexible body of pertinent state law continuously being adopted to changing circumstances affecting all creditors." 24
In addition to recognizing the benefits of certainty and ease of administration, this reasoning portrays the realization that in this area state law, being
more in tune with current conditions, is apt to be better law. To some
extent this conclusion leads to nonuniformity of tax collection, which is undesirable 2 because an inequality of tax liability may result solely from the
residence of the parties. The second justification for the Court's decision,
however, may outweigh the benefits to be derived from uniformity. Moreover, the various states have an interest in determining whether, and to
what extent, their insurance programs will protect beneficiaries from the
claims of creditors of the insured. For example, since many of the beneficiaries are likely to be dependents, the state may legitimately desire to
prevent them from becoming destitute and thus wards of the state. 26 Every
state has a statutory provision exempting proceeds payable to a beneficiary
from the claims of the creditors of the insured.2 7 On the whole, this protection is quite extensive, although there are some variations from state
to state, both as to type of beneficiary protected 2 8 and amount of protection
20. H.R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1926).
21. Id. at 44.

22. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
23. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24. Instant case at 45.
25. Cahn, Local Law and Federal Taxation, 52
U.L. REv. 693 (1957).

26.

VANCE, INSURANCE

YALE

L.J. 799 (1943); 52 Nw.

§ 124 (3d ed. 1951) ; 25 VA. L. REV. 588 (1939).

27. See generally 22 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcricE ch. 478 (1947);
1 RIcHAIRs, INSURANCE § 136 (5th ed. 1952) ; VANCE, Op. cit. sipra note 26; Young,
Bankruptcy and Exemption Statutes Affecting Disposition of Life Insurance Policies,
in 1 AssoCIATIoN OF LiFE INSURANCE COUNSEL at XXIII (1918) ; 25 VA. L. REv. 588

(1939).

28. Some statutes protect the class of widows and dependents. E.g., ILl.. REv.
ch. 73, § 850 (1957). Others extend protection to those who have an insurable
interest in the insured. E.g., N.H. REv. L. ch. 327, § 2 (1942). Still others have no
restrictions as to beneficiaries. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 166. As construed by most
STAT.
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afforded.2 9 The trend clearly has been to broaden the exemption."0 In
light of the Court's reasoning plus this state interest, uniformity of taxation
would seem clearly to be outweighed. However, uniformity need not be
completely ignored. The fact that all states provide some exemption from
liability and the presence of a trend to broaden these exemptions leads to
the argument that if complete non-liability were to be given beneficiaries
then uniformity could be gained with a minimum abrogation of state policy.
Congressional action could achieve this result. However, it seems unlikely
that this action will be in the form of an exemption to all beneficiaries from
transferee liability, since the Internal Revenue Service has, from the beginning of this conflict, taken the position that all beneficiaries should be liable
as transferees. 31 A second approach would be a judicial definition of the
word "transferee" in section 311 to exclude beneficiaries of life insurance
policies. This question was avoided by the Supreme Court in the instant
case. Moreover, for a court in a future case to determine that beneficiaries are not within the term "transferee" would present difficulties. To
exclude beneficiaries as a class would encompass both good-faith beneficiaries and those to whom the transfer was made in fraud of creditors.
But any exclusion of the latter group from the definition of "transferee"
would be contrary to the basic concept of transferee liability which traditionally was aimed at those transfers in fraud of creditors. 32 The exclusion
of such transferees would also be contrary to the state policy of nonexemption when the transfer is in fraud of creditors. On the other hand,
no support would seem to be found in section 311(f) for excluding only
good-faith beneficiaries from the definition of "transferee." This section
states: "[T]he term 'transferee' includes heir, legatee, devisee, and distributee." Since none of the classes included within section 311 make any
distinction as to fraud, there is no basis for adding a new classification with
this distinction. Thus, any attempt to achieve uniformity by a judicial
definition exempting beneficiaries from the application of section 311 would
appear unsound. The only feasible means of achieving uniformity is
through the state legislatures themselves increasing exemptions until they
encompass all good-faith beneficiaries, which action would be consistent
with the current trend. The Stern decision may provide an impetus toward
this result.
courts and writers, state statutes give no protection in situations where the estate
of the insured is named as beneficiary or where the insured paid premiums while
insolvent. See Pearlman v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1946) ; Kieferdorf v.
Commissioner, 142 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1944).
29. Some states have statutes exempting a stated face amount of insurance in
amounts ranging from $5,000 in Wisconsin to $15,000 in Iowa, or an amount which
can be procured with annual premiums of less than $250 or $500. See VANCE, op. cit.
supra note 26.

30. Ibid.
31. See 70 H~A.v. L. Rav. 1145 (1957).
32. 9 MERTExs, op. cit., supra note 17, §§ 53.01, .10.

